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IN TIH1 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2759 
THELMA CHAPPELL, Plaintiff in Error, 
vet·sus 
MARTHA .C. WHIT.E, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR A W.RIT OF ERROR. 
To the H onomble Justices of the 8'ltpreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
· Your petitioner, Thelma Chappell, respectfully represents 
that she is aggrieved by the action of the Circuit Court of 
Norfolk County in a certain proceeding at law lately therein 
pending in which your petition was a defendant and Martha 
C. White was plaintiff, wherein such proceedings were· had, 
that on · the 20th day of May, 1943, a final judgment, in the 
sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00) 
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff against your peti-
tioner. 
A transcript of the record in said case duly certified is 
herewith filed and is asked to be read and taken as a part 
. hereof. · 
The page references in this petition will be the pages of 
the transcript of the record. 
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2* *THE FACTS. 
This was a proceeding by way of notice of motion for judg-
ment instituted by the plaintiff against the defendants~ 
Thelma Chappell and J. W. ,Chappell, for damages in the sum 
of Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00), sustained by 
the plaintiff while riding as a g1iest in an automobile driven 
by plaintiff's cousin, Thelma Chappell, and owned by the de-
fendant, J. W. Chappell. The trial court sustained the de-
fendant's motion to strike out the plaintiff's evidence as to 
J. W. Chappell, and no further reference will be made to 
this particular defendant. The question of the gross negli-
gence of the defendant, Thelma Chappell, was submitted to 
the jury, which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. 
· .All of the occupants of the car involved in the accident 
were related. On the day of the accident they had attended 
a family teunion at Franklin, Virginia, this being their fourth 
annual pilgrimag~ tog·ether. All parties were familiar with 
the road in question. The car driven by the defendant was 
a 1942 Pontiac, apparently in excellent condition, and had 
only been driven two thousand miles. The accident hap-
pened while returning home, approximately one mile west 
of Holland, Virg'inia, on July 10, 1942, at about six-thirty 
o'clock in the afternoon, it being broad daylight at the time. 
The plaintiff, a woman sixty-four years of ag·e, was seated 
in the middle of the rear seat. The witnesses, Mrs. Brown 
and Mrs. Rowe, were seated on the left and rig·ht of the 
plaintiff, respectively. At the time of the accident Mrs. Brown 
had just :finished placing her baby in her lap (R., p. 37). 
3* *The defendant was driving· the car and on the front 
seat to her right was seated her daughter, Peggy, and to 
Peggy's right was seated the defendant's young son. 
The undisputed facts are that immediately prior to the 
accident it had been raining, but all witnesses testified they 
believed it had stopped raining at the time of the accident; 
that the road was wet; that the road was a three-lane hig·h-
way approximately thirty (30) feet wide with shoulders on 
eaeh side varying· according· to estimates from four to six 
feet in width; that the automobile was proceeding in an east-
erlv direction toward Holland; that, at the moment of the 
accident, there was no traffic in Right going in either direc-
tion; that immediately vrior to the accident the defendant 
was driving on her right-hand side of the road at a mod-
erate rate of speed, estimated by the adult occupants to be 
somewhere between thirty-five and fortv-five miles per hour 
(R., pp. 37, 61, 76, 82). All witnesses admit that no question 
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of speed was involved. The road was perfectly level and 
straight wtth no curves in sight; it was originally concrete, 
but was covered with black top gravel; when wet it was to 
some degree "slick and slippery" (R., pp. 22, 82). While 
the occupants of the rear seat had been "jabbering·" (R., p. 
47), the defendant was not engaged in this conversation and 
no one heard any words spoken by or between the def end-
ant, Mrs. Chappell, and her children or any other occupant 
of the car. 
On the left side of the road facing east toward Holland 
there is and was a rather deep ditch in which ditch the au-
tomobile ultimately overturned, resulting in serious in-
4* juries to the plaintiff and some injuries to the witness, 
*Mrs. Brown, who has also asserted a claim ag·ainst the 
defendant (R.., p. 51); there is a rut fifteen inches deep run.:. 
ning transverse to this shoulder of the road, beginning ap-
proximately six to eight inches from the edge of the concrete 
and continuing down to the ditch bank (R., pp. 28, 29). The 
witness, Eure, remarked tllat at one time a tractor was stuck 
in this hole or rut (R., p. 28). 
The witnesses all stated that, prior to the accident, they 
were paying· no particular attention to the operation of the 
automobile as said operation was normal in every respect. 
The occupants of the back seat all testified that the first noticP 
they had of any impending danger was when they heard the 
defendant exclaim ''Oh''; they then noticed that the left 
side of the car was on, or almost on, the grass shoulder on 
said left side of the road. The accident was then imminent 
as the automobile immediately ran off the paved portion of 
the hig·hway (R., pp. 12, 27), but the plaintiff's evidence is 
silent as to when, why and for how long a time the automo-
bile had left its normal travel on its right side of the road. 
The witness, Mrs. Brmvn, g·ave her version of the accident 
by saying that when she first noticed anything· unusual, the 
car was already on the left side of the highway at the edge 
of the paved portion thereof (R., p. 48) and that her atten-
tion was attracted by the defendant's exclamation and there-
after claims she saw the defendant raise her head (R., p. 
37) from a position slightly down to her right (R., p. 50) and 
immediately placed l1er right hand near the top of the steer-
ing wheel and endeavored to turn the car to the right (R., 
p. 38); that she (Mrs. Brown) did not know where defend-
ant's right band was prior to that time (R., p. 50); that she 
was sitting· directly behind the defendant with her baby 
5«· in her lap and could *not see defendant's left hand (R., 
p. 50); that once the car was on the left side of the road, 
the accident happened "simultaneously" (R., pp. 49, 50). 
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The plaintiff, Mrs. ·white, testified that the car was prac-
tically off the road when she saw that something was wrong 
(R., p. 55); that she saw the defendant raising up (R., pp. 
55, 65) ; that she was rendered uncoi:i.scious as a result of the 
accident, but regained consciousness before she was removed 
from the scene; that thereafter she again became uncon-
scious and remained so for about a week and did not even 
know the car had turned over until the defndant visited her 
in the hospital (R., p. 56). 
There is some conflict in the testimony as to whether or not 
the auto skidded over to the left side of the road. The plain-
tiff's first impression was that it had skidded (R.., p. 63); the 
witness, Mrs. Rowe, testified that the car skidded, but ad-
mitted that there was nothing unusual in the skidding or 
bumping (R.., p. 79-); the defendant definitely states that the 
car skidded and she did not apply the brakes (R., p. 83); the 
witness, Mrs. Brown, made the statement that there was no 
bump or skidding of the automobile (~., p. 39) and that she 
-had no recollection of the movement of the car until it was 
on the left side of the road (R., p. 46). 
The foregoing statement of facts cover, we submit, th~ 
pertinent portions of the evidenc~ with the exception of an 
alleged statement made ten to fifteen 1niniites after the ac-
cident by the defendant's eight"'."year-old daughter, which we 
respectfully submit, was and is inadmissible as a violation 
of the hearsay rule. The manner in which able counsel for 
the plaintiff sought to introduce this statement was unusual 
and the trial court's action thereon constituted prejudicial 
error. 
6* *Plaintiff's counsel :first called the child, Peggy Chap-
pell, as his witness. After certain preliminary question:;, 
he asked her what she said to her mother before the car left 
the right side of the road, to which the child answered "noth-
ing'' (R., p. 32). Counsel then propounded the following 
question (R., p. 33) : 
"What did you say at the time of the accident?" 
After objection by the defendant, the jury was excluded and 
the child then stated (R., p. 34): 
"I didn't say anything." 
Counsel further questioned the child as to what she had 
said after the car went into the ditch and she said that there 
was considerable ''hollering", but that she had said noth-
ing. The fact that the parties were "hollering" is substanti-
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ated by the witness Eure (R., p. 25 ). Plaintiff's counsel 
thereupon started to contradict his own witness and, upon 
objection, elected not to press his questioning· further and 
the child's testimony on this line of questioning was excluded. 
It is noted that the child's denial of making any statement 
never reached the jury and hence the defendant 'Was precl'IJ,ded 
from arguing this fact. 
By the ·witness, Mrs. Brown, plaintiff's counsel again en-
deavored to introduce the alleged statement of the child. The 
question to this witness (R., p. 40) was: 
'' Y 011 went on down and turned over; what did the little 
girl say when you turned over?" 
7* *The trial Judge immediately sustained defendant's ob-
jection, in conformity with his prior ruling on the child's 
own testimony, but thereafter reversed himself after hearing 
the testimony of the witness during the absence of the jury, 
The witness then testified and subsequently repeated in the 
presence of the jury, that the statement was made between 
ten ctnd fifteen minutes after the car turned over (R., pp. 41, 
42 and 44); that it took nearly that leng·th of time for the 
occupants to crawl out of the car and they were all up on 
the 11ighway at the time of the alleg·ed statement. The per-
tinent statement alleged to have been made by the child, ac-
cording to the testimony of Mrs. Brown, was (R., p. 41) : 
"""What will Daddy say! What will Daddy say? If Mother 
hadn't been ,qettin,q 1wud off my .<;hoe, it wouldn't have ha.p-
pened. '' . 
After the Court changed its ruling· and decided to admit this 
8tatcment, defendant's counsel called attention to the fact 
that the words "It 'Wouldn't have happened" constituted an 
expression of opinion by the child and as such was inadmis-
Aible. Despite t"4is fact the witness thereafter testified in 
the presence of the jury, using· the same words (R., p. 44) 
and defendant's counsel ag·ain objected~ but to no avail.. Sub-
sequently on cross examination of this witness, the Court, 
realizing the probability of error, made this statement (R., 
p. 45): 
"I think the jury should be told that the ophiion of the 
little child is not to be taken by you as evidence, ~entlemen.'' 
The Court did not specify what portion of the statement con-
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stituted an opinion and furthermore this testimony had al-
ready had its damaging effect. 
It is interesting to note that the only parties hearing suc>h 
a statement were the plaintiff and Mrs. Brown, botl1 of 
8* whom have asserted claims *against the defendant. The 
witness, Mrs. Rowe, and the defendant both denied hav-
ing heard any such remark (R., pp. 79, 80, 85 ). The excludecl 
testimonv of the child herself was to the same .3ffoct. The 
defendant further denied turning or looking· toward the child 
or endeavoring to get any mud off her shoe (R., p. 85 ), but 
did make reference to an unrelated incident which had oc-
curred several miles from the scene of the accident and, in 
fact, before reaching the main highway (R., pp. 85, 86). 
We now must look at the plaintiff's testimony with respect 
to the alleged statement of the child. While Mrs. Brown's 
recollection of the statement was that the child made refer-
ence to the def end ant actu.ally getting mud off the shoe .. the 
plaintiff's recollection of this statement differs materially with 
that of Mrs. Brown. According to the plaintiff, the child's 
statement was (R., p. 56) : 
·'Oh, Mama, what is Daddy going to say? What is Daddy 
g·oing to say? I was the whole cause of it. 
"Mr. Hoffman: We object to that. 
"The Court: As to 'the whole cause of it', that was an 
opinion, and, gentlemen, do not consider it. 
'' By Mr. Gilman : 
"Then what1 
"She said, 'If I hadn't told J.l!other to look down at my 
foot, it woitld not have happened'." 
Therein lies the dang-er of admitting hearsay testimonv. 
Even if it be assumed for the purpose of argument that tlie 
child made some such statement, it became very material 
in determining the question of gross negligence whethee 
9* the •Mother merely looked at the child's shoe or was 
using her right hand to knock the mud off of said shoe. 
In many decided cases Courts have ref erred to the ad-
mission or rejection of statements purporting to be a part 
of the res gestae as harmless error. In the persent case it 
cannot be harmless error under any conceivable view taken. 
It is unquestionably prejudicial error of the worst kincl. 
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
Error is assig~ned as follows: 
1. The Court erred in allowing the alleged statement, iu 
~hole or in part, of the infant child to be submitted to the 
JUl'Y. 
2. The Court erred in overruling the defendant's motions 
to strike out the plaintiff's evidence. 
3. Tbe Court erred in granting at the plaintiff's request, 
Instructions P-1, P-2 and P-3. · 
4. The Court erred in refusing to grant at the defendant's 
request, Instructions 1-D, 5·-D, and 9-D. 
5. The Court erred in overruling the defendant's motion 
to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial upon the 
grounds that said· verdict was contrary to the law and evi-· 
deuce. 
6. The Court erred in entering final judgment for the plain-
tiff. 
ARGUMENT. 
The various issues raised will be dealt with in the follow-
ing order: 
(1) The admissibility of the alleged statement made by the 
infant child. 
lOit i» (2) The gross negligence doctrine. 
( 3) The instructions. 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ALLEGED STATE-
MENT MADE BY THE INF'ANT CHILD. 
In discussing this question we desire to first point out the 
very pertinent fact that the denial of the child as to the 
making of any statement never reached the jury. At the out-
set the Court adopted the view that such a statement was in-
admissible and the case proceeded upon this theory until 
the subsequent testimony of Mrs. Brown. We cannot con-
ceive why the denial by the child was inadmissible yet her 
alleged statements as testified to by the plaintiff and Mrs. 
Brown were admitted. The question might be asked why 
counsel for defendant did not thereafter put the child back 
on the witness stand. to contradict the plaintiff and Mrs. 
Brown. At the outset we wish to point out that the child was 
called as a witness for the plaintiff and furthermore it is 
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uo part of the defendant's duty to prove the plaintiff's case. 
Defendant had no reason to believe that the Court would 
thereafter reverse its position and consequently it was im-
possible to present this issue to the jury. The defendant 
and Mrs. Rowe both testified that they did not hear the child 
make any such statement, although it may be argued that 
such testimony is not a direct denial. 
The statements of the plaintiff and Mrs. Brown are merely 
efforts to impeach the denial by the child that any such state-. 
ment was made. It is hardly necessary to observe that 
11 t:, this impeachment evidence does not constitute *sub-
stantive or primary evidence in favor of the plaintiff 
against the defendant on the question of gross negligence-
hence it has no probative value. They do not purport to. 
know whether or not the defendant was looking at or getting 
mud off the child's shoe. The only direct evidence offered 
was that of the defendant which constituted a denial. Tlm 
child was in court and offered as a witness for the plaintiff--
she was not called as an adverse witness. The trial Court!'! 
having :first excluded the child's statement as to what, if any-
thing, she said at the time of the accident or immediately 
thereafter, then proceeded to permit counsel for the plain-
tiff to impeach his own witness by hearsay testimony under 
the guise of a res gestae declaration. 
We next desire to call attention to the fact that, despite· 
warning·s from counsel, tbe Court permitted :Mrs. Brown, in 
relating· the alleged statement, to use the child's words, "It 
woitld not have happened", which in itself constitutes a legal 
conclusion and matter of opinion (R., p. 44). That such a 
legal conclusion and matter of opinion is clearly inadmissible 
we need only refer to the colloquy between Court and coun-
sel (R., p. 43) wherei'll it was admitted that this portion of' 
the statement was not proper evidence. It was not until 
after plaintiff's counsel had completed his direct examination 
and the witness was on cross examination that the Court •. 
realizing the error, endeavored to remedy the situation by 
advising· the jury that the opinion of the child was not evi-
dence (R., p. 45). In addition to the argument that the cor"'." 
rection came to late, it is apparent that a jury composed of' 
laymen is not capable of ascertaining· what portion of' 
12* the statement constituted an expression of opinion and 
*the Court should have gone further in its explanation 
in view· of the fact that defendant's counsel had been min-
utely particular in moving to exclude the staement in whole 
or in part. 
We have previously ref erred to the material variance in 
/ 
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the alleg·ed statement as quoted by the plaintiff and Mrs. 
Brown. It is a well reeog·uized rule of law that no case can 
rise higher than the plaintiff's testimony and we accept state-
ment of opposing counsel made during the trial wherein he 
stated (R., p. 35): 
"I am not bound by a solitary witness but I am, bo,und by. 
the plaintiff'' s testi'l1iony." · 
If such is the case, the testimony of Mrs. Brown as to the 
alleged statement must be excluded and disregarded. View-
ing .Mrs. Brown's reference to this statement, the inference 
is that the defendant was in the act of getting m:u,d off the 
child's shoe. This, if admissible, may or may not be evidence 
of probative value depending upon the proper consideratiou 
of the gross negligence doctrine and depei1ding upon th'; 
duration of the alleged inattention. It is sig11ificant that the 
record is silent as to any inattention or the length of the 
same prior to the defendant's exclamation "Oh" at which 
time the automobile was then in a position of danger. How-
ever, the plaintiff's testimony with respect to the child's 
statement contains no evidence· of probative value (R., p. 
56). The mere alleged fact that the child told her :Mother 
to look do.wn at her foot is not evidence, as there is no evi-
dence that the defendant heard said statement or did, in fact, 
look at the shoe-furthermore, the defendant expressly de-
nies this fact (R., p. 85). 
13* '*Many courts and attorneys have misunderstood the 
meaning of the term "res gesta ". Interpreting this 
Latin phraseology we :find that it means" thin.gs done". Thus, 
we see that the purpose of allowing this exception to the 
hearsay rule is to prove facts and not bare statenients. It 
is often said that res gestae is not the witness spea,king, but 
the transaction voic·in.Q itself. In considering spontaneous 
declarations we have observed that the better authorities, in 
permitting· such statements to be introduced, have consistently 
stated that the spontaneity of the 'zttterance is the giiaranty 
of its trnthworthiness in subsit'lttion for that provided by 
oath and cross examination. We respectfully submit that the 
trial court failed to gTasp this point. It must be admitted 
that the alleg·ed statement of the infant child cannot bind 
the defendant in this case. Siwh being the case, what facts 
have been proven by the alleged state1nent of the child and 
where is the ,quaranty of trustworthiness which is so forciblv 
required when, in .fact, the alle,qed statetnents as related by 
the vlainf.iff and· the witness, Mrs. B-row11,, are different? 
1 o Supreme · Court of Appeals of Virg·inia 
With the foregoing points in mind we now come to a co~-
sideration of the authorities. 
In the vast majority of cases, the purported statement 
sought to be introduced as a part of the res gestae is that of 
one of the actors, either plaintiff or defendant. The Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virg·inia has noted this distinction in 
the case of Ellis v. JTirginia Rail'U,ay and Power Company~ 
132 Va. 24, 110 S. E. 382, wherein it was sought to introduce 
by the plaintiff, the following statement made immediately 
after the accident : 
14* *"The motorman came up and said 'it is not my fault' 
and the man who picked. me up said 'It was your fault, 
you hardly gave me time to g·et out of the way, and I wa8 
in front of her')' 
This statement was not admitted in evidence and on ap-
peal, the ruling of the trial court was affirmed. Moreover, 
the opinion points out that the witness who was supposed 
to have made the statement was present at the trial, testi-
fied fully, and by his testimony presented evidence directly 
in conflict with the alleged statement. In its opinion the Court 
admits that the question is not free from doubt and dis-
tinguishe$ the case of JVashington-Va. Ry. Co. v. Deahl, 126 
Va. 141, 100 S. E. 840, 842, by saying: 
"There are, however, certain important differences be-
tween the character and setting of the declaration which the 
court admitted in the Deahl Case and that which it excluded 
in the instant case. In the former,. it was the statement of 
the motorman, one of the actors, whose train had just 
crashed into. a truck, and his exclamation was purely spon-
taneous and uttered clearly under the spur and excitement 
of the accident, and it was dis.tinctly illustrative of what he 
himself had done. In the latter, the case at bar, the declara-
tion was that of a third party, not spontaneously uttered, not 
an· incident of the accident itself nor called forth by it, but a 
statement made subsequently by a third party, and in reply 
to one made by the motorman.'' (Italics supplied.) 
Striking a comparison in point of time between the Ellis case 
and the case at bar, we note that the interval in the former 
was "very brief", whereas in the latter the little child's 
statement, if made, was not given until ten or fifteen minutes 
after the accident. The trial Court, in admitting the child's 
statement placed stress upon the fact that all were excited 
Thelma Chappell v. Martha C. White. 11 
at the time and that it had taken nearly that amount of 
15* time for the parties to extricate themselves from *the 
overturned car. A "spontaneous" utterance infers the 
lack of vremeditation or ,reflection. The element of excite-
ment does not necessarily infer that the utterance was spon-
taneous. Human nature is such that, following a serious ac-
cident, excitement is likely to prevail for many hours there-
after. The very nature of the statement itself indicates that 
the statement, if made, was the subject of reflection by the 
child. During the ten or fifteen minutes consumed in en-
deavoring to get out of the car, the child, uninjured as she 
was, had time to meditate as to the possible causes of the ac-
cident. The very essence of the alleged statement indicate..s 
reflexion by the child, first as 'to what her "Daddy" would 
say and secondly, as to the cause of the accident. The ele-
ments in themselves negative the thought that the statement 
was ''spontaneous". 
The res ,qestae doctrine is a mucl1 abused and confused 
subject of discussion. It is universally recog·nizecl that upon 
the facts of each case rests the question of the admissibility 
of an admittedly hearsay ~tatement which carries with it a 
presumption that it was the result of deliberation. In ex-
amining the cited cases and text-book authorities on the sub-
ject, we find that it is very difficult to establish any hard 
and fast rule with respect to the same, however, in the case 
of Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 92 Pac. (2d) 1113, 127 A. L. R. 
1022, we find what appears to be the clearest and most con-
cise statement of the elements involved. Quoting in part 
from the court's opinion, we find: 
"The statement or declaration concerning which testi-
mony is offered must, in order to make such evidence admis-
sible, possess at least the f ollowin,q essential elements: 
16* *" (1) The statement or declaration made must relate 
to the main event and must explain, elucidate, or in 
some way characterize that event; 
"(2) it must be a·nautral declaration or statement growing 
out of the event, and not a mere narra,tive of a past, com-
vleted a,ff air; 
'' (3) it must be a statement of fact and not the mere ex-
pression of an opinion; 
'' ( 4) it must be a sponta;neoits or instructive utterance of 
thought, dominated or evoked by the transaction or occur~ 
rence itself, and not the proditct of premeditation, reflection, 
or desi,qn; 
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'' ( 5) while the declaration or statement need not·· be co-
incident or contemporaneous with the occurrence of the event, 
it must be made at such time and under such circumstances 
as will exclitde the presu1npUon that it is the 1resitlt of delib-
eration, and 
" ( 6) it must appear that the declaration or statement was 
made by one who either participated in the transaction or 
:witnessed· the act or fact concerning which the declaration 
or statement was made." (Italics supplied.) 
All of these elements are essential. We submit that the al-
leged statements as presented violate (2), (3), (4) and (5) 
as above set forth. 
In Norfolk&; C.R. Co. v. Suffolk Litrnber Co., 92 Va. 413, 
444, 23 S. E. 737, the following question to a witness was 
asked: 
'' State whether or not, after the accident occurred, you 
walked over that crossing with Mr. Wrightson, a conductor 
of the Norfolk and Carolina railroad, and, if so, state what 
conversation occurred between you on that occasion in re-
gard to this matter." · 
After objection by counsel for defendant, the witness was 
asked ho,v long after the accident the conversation took place 
to which he replied: 
17* *"I judge probably twenty minutes or half an hour-
something like that; I cannot state positively what time 
it was, but the accident was entirely over, and we were walk-
ing up to the station." 
The trial court permitted the witness to relate the conversa-
tion had with the conductor. On appeal this ruling was held 
to be reversible error. 
Again in Blue Ridge Light Co. v. Price, 108 Va. 652,. 654, 
62 S. E. 938, the appellate court excluded a statement made 
by the motorman of a street car to a witness involved in the 
accident, which, in point of time, was made after the plain-
tiff had been injured, arose and entered the car. The trial 
court had admitted the statement and it was contended that 
its admission could not have affected the verdict of the jury. 
In dealing with this question it is significant to note the 
Court's reasoning (P. 655): 
'' How much the evidence improperly admitted may have 
\ 
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affected the minds of the jury in reaching their verdict it is 
impossible· for this court to estimate, and it would be going 
beyond our legitimate function to enter upon any such specu-
lation.'' 
So we observe it is impossible for the court to estimate what 
weight the jury gave to the opinion statement as made by 
Mrs. Brown (R., p. 44), the effect of which the trial court 
endeavored to lessen by its remarks to the jury a few min-
utes thereafter (R., p. 45). 
Reviewing further the decisions of the highest court of 
this state on the res gestae rule, we again refer to the case 
of Washington-Va. Ry. Co. v. Deahl, supra, in which case the 
court admitted as a part of the res gestae, a statement made 
by the motorman immediately after the accident, said mo-
torman having come out of the car and walked directly to 
the driver of the plaintiff's car, to whom he made the state-
ment. In the Deahl case, our appellate court for the 
18,x, first *time enters into a discussion of the res ge.qfoe 
rule which, it says, is incapable of any precise defini-
tion. The case of Blue Ridge Light Co. v. Price, supra, is 
cited and . distinguished as well as Vicksburg & Meridian R. 
C. v. O'Brien, 119 U. S~ S9, 7 Sup. Ct. 118, 30 L. Ed. 299, where 
the statement of the engineer made ten to thirty minutes 
after the accident was held to be inadmissible. In the last 
cited case the majority opinion pointed out that if the con-
trary view should be maintained, it would follow that the 
declaration, if favorable to the defendant, would have been 
admissible in defendant's behalf as part of the res gestae, 
without calling the declarant as a witness-a proposition that 
finds no support in the law of evidence. 
Counsel for plaintiff would have the alleged statement 
of the child binding upon the mother, who is the defendant 
in this case. In the case of Norfolk & lVestern R. R. Co. v. 
Groseclose's Admr., 88 Va. 267, 272, 13 S. E. 454, the court 
refused to permit the defendant company to prove the declara-
tions of the mother of the deceased child made immediatelv 
after the accident. · 
It is a well settled rule of law that the act itself must be 
first established before the illustrative declaration can be 
admitted. Bearing in mind the sharp distinction between 
the child's alleged statement as related by the plaintiff and 
Mrs. Brown, we have a situation in which one statement, if 
made, may or may not have probative value, whereas, if we 
accept the ulaintiff's version of the child's statement, we 
have no evidence at all. Such a set of facts brings us clearly 
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within the rule laid down in many Virginia cases to the ef-
fect that a verdict cannot be sustained 'if based upon 
19* mere guess, *conjecture, unreasonable inferences or 
mere probability. 
In 20 Am. Jur. 1195, p. 1047, we find: 
"Hearsay testimony of a witness based upon his memory 
of oral statements made by others is ordinarily to be re-
ceived and weig·hed with caution because of the infirmity of 
human memory. Human memory is too treacherous to place 
much reliance upon an attempted recital, however honest, of 
a conversation that has taken place between other parties. 
• * • The integrity of the witness is not at all impugned by 
the conclusion that his memory is at fault, but obviously, if 
he is influenced by unconscious bias or pecuniary interest, 
his testimony must be received with even greater circum-
spection.'' 
All of the foregoing must be considered in determining the 
ultimate question of gross negligence. That such neglig·ence-
cannot be established by conjecture, etc., we note in Chesa-
peake & 0. R. Co. v. Heath, 103 Va. 64, 48 S. E. 508, the court 
says: 
"The party who affirms neg·ligence must establish it by 
proof sufficient to satisfy reasonable and well-balanced minds. 
The evidence rnust shoio more than a. probability of a negli-
gent act. An inf ere nee cannot he drawn from a presumption, 
but must be founded on some fact legally established. This 
court has repeatedly held that when liability depends upon 
carelessness or fault of a person or his agents, the right of 
recovery depends upon the same being shown by competent 
evidence, and it is incumibent upon such a plaintiff to furnish 
ev·idence to show how and why the accident occurred,-some. 
fact or facts b11 which it can be deterrnined by the .fury, amd 
not be left entirely to con.f ectu,1·e, ,gu,es.~ or random, .iud.qment, 
'u,von mere supposition, without a, sinl}le known fact.'' (Ital-
ics supplied.) 
This language is reiterated in many later cases, among 
which some are as follows : 
Norfolk ~ TV. R. Co. v. Brig.qs, 103 Va. 105, 48 S. E. 521. 
Moore Lime Co. v. ,Johnston, 103 Va. 84, 48 S. E. 577. 
Atlwntic & Co. v. Wa,tkins, 104 Va. 154, 51 S. E. 172. 
Grant v. Webb, 166 Va. 299, 184 S. E. 465. 
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20* *These cases state the general rule prevailing through-
out the United States. ln Anderson/s '' An Aut01nob-ile 
Accident Huit", p. 1058, Sec. 868, the author lays it down that 
"the plaintiff's right of recovery must be predicated. upon 
somet!Jing more than conjecture, surmise, suspicion, specula-
tion or supposition'' and further that ''whether or not the 
evidence raises more than a surmise, conjecture or suspicion 
is to be determined by the court in the first instance''. 
While the authorities immediately hereiuabove cited are 
likewise applicable to our discussion of the gross negligence 
doctrine, we will not again repeat them. Suffice it to say 
that there obviously must be more than mere guess or con-
jecture to establish gross negligence. Can the Court state 
from its observation of the evidence, even assuming that the 
child made some statement approximately ten to fifteen min-
utes after the accident, exactly what the child said-did the 
child ask her mother to look at the mud on her shoe or was 
the mother actually getting· mud off the child's shoe? Vv e 
submit that if either of the above statements were made it 
is far more plausible to assume that the mother would not 
want to dirty the car by permitting mud to fall on the floor 
of the car and for this reason, if for no other, Mrs. Brown's 
recollection of the child's statement is bound to be erroneous. 
Thus, we submit that the alleged statement of the child as 
related by the plaintiff and Mrs. Brown, contradictory as it 
is, is inadmissible as hearsay evidence for the reasons here-
inabove mentioned. The motions to exclude this testimony, 
in whole or in part, should have been sustained. 
21 * *THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINE. 
·while we have dealt at length with the res gcstae rule, we 
nevertheless feel that the Court will ultimately determine 
that, irrespective of the admissibility of the child's alleg·ecl 
statement, the plaintiff's case must fall for the obvious rea-
son that, under any consideration of the evidence, no gross 
or culpable neg·ligence has been shown to have existed. 
Here ag·aiu we have the typical case of one member of a 
familv instituting a suit ag·a.inst another. We are not un-
mindful of the impression a jury derives from such a situa-
tion ; we a re also cognizant of the jury's reaction in an un-
fortunate accident where the plaintiff is seriously injured. 
Needless to say the laymen pay little or no attention to the 
technical distinctions between simple and gross neglig·ence. 
Therein lies the beauty of our system, for a Court, sympa-
-, 
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thetic though it may be, will determine the principles of each 
case unswayed by human appeal and sympathy. 
We believe tha.t; from a fair and impartial view of all of 
the facts herein, if the jury's verdict is sustained, it would 
be well to do away with the doctrine. of Boggs v. Plybon, 157 
Va. 30, 160 S. E. 77, and re-establish the former principles 
of law applicable in all guest cases. While we realize that 
many issues of fact are properly submitted to a jury to de-
termine whether or not g·ross negligence exists, yet all of 
the decided cases appear to have present some radical ele-
ments of negligence such as speed, falling asleep, passing or 
excessive speed on a hill or curve, driving on wrong· side of 
road at a blind curve, passing on a bridge and violating four 
( 4) laws at the same time, running into a properly lighted 
car or parked vehicle, running head on into approach-
22* ing *traffic, drinking, reckless driving in congested 
traffic, and the like. 
The true rule to determine gross negligence is : 
DO THE ACTS OF THE DE·FENDANT SHOCK FAIR~ 
MINDED MEN? 
Bear in mind the obvious fact that no mother, driving an 
automobile in which two of her own children are riding, 
along with other near relatives, is going· to operate such a 
vehicle in a manner intended to injure the occupants. Our 
worthy opponent concedes that there is no evidence of wilful 
and wanton disregard of the safety of the occupants of the 
car, but vigorously contends that the case falls in that "no 
man's land'' where the jury has the right to determine what 
constitutes gross negligence. 
At the risk of repetition we again point out some of the 
pertinent points in connection with this accident as follows: 
(1) A straight, level highway thirty feet in width. 
(2) No traffic in either direction. 
( 3) No excess speed. 
( 4) An automobile in good working· condition. 
( 5) Daylight. 
(6) No complaints as to prior operation of automobile. 
(7) Driver familiar with highway. 
(8) Highway wet, but not raining at time of accident. 
(9) No drinking by the occupants. 
Und~r such a set of facts, what constitutes gross and cul-
pable neg·ligence? Human nature is such, that under these 
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facts, constant attention to the highway is frequently 
23,x, not given; drivers may light cigarettes, using *lighters 
which are, in many instances, on the extreme right of 
the dashboard, making it necessary for the driver to reach 
some distance to his right-if an accident occurred under the 
facts stated, would such conduct be construed as gross and 
culpable negligence? We believe not. The cited cases in 
Virg·inia have repeatedly held that casual inattention does 
not constitute gross negligence. 
Carroll v. Miller, 175 Va. 388, 9 S. E. (2d) 322. 
In the foregoing case a verdict and judgment for the plain-
tiff was reversed and final judgment entered for defendant 
on appeal. ·while there was some evidence of a possible 
blowout, the Court said that this was immaterial. The 
physical facts were that the accident happened on a clear 
night; the road was dry; it had several curves but none were 
very sharp; the road was 20 feet wide and bounded by a curb 
4 inches high; the defendant, who was familiar with the road 
and while operating the car at a speed of 35 miles per hour, 
endeavored to negotiate a curve to his left but ran over the 
curb and struck a tree, thereby seriously injuring the plain-
tiff. The Court said : 
'' Casual inattention is not gross negligence, and the only 
evidence of it here is that the car did leave the road. This 
in itself is not even per se negligence.'' 
In dealing with the gross negligence doctrine, it is said: 
"Putting one's self in the place of the parties, to be gross 
it should shock fair-minded men.'' 
The recent case of Kru,eger v. Taylor, 37 Fed. Supp. 412, 
wherein a verdict for the plaintiff was set aside, is also a 
typical case of inattention. While this decision is from the 
District .Court of the United States for the District of Co-
lumbia, the law of Virginia was applied as the accident 
24* took *place therein. The defendant failed to negoti-
ate a 22° left curve following a slight upgrade; he had 
been driving about the middle of the road and swerved to 
get to the right, but went off the road hitting a tree 6 feet 
from the edge of the road, the tree having been visible for a 
distance of 200· feet. 
It is significant that the jury's verdicts in cases involving 
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gross neglig·ence have not been given the same weight as in 
other types of cases. In Doub v. Weaver, 164 Va. 96, 178 S. 
E. 794, the Court adopted as its opinion, the able opinion of 
the trial judge which, in part, reads as follows: 
'' Reasonably fair-1n·inded 1nen, ,,night differ uvon qitestion 
of the negUgence of the def en.dant in, this case, and the ver-
dict of the jury in this case in favor of the plaintiff is con-
clusive of this question, establishin,.r; as a fact in the case that 
the defendant was g,uilty of negligence_; but it is not conclusive 
i~pon the court as necessarily i·m,porting that he wc1,s guilty 
of gross negligence. I am of the opinion that, if he was neg-
ligent, as the jury have found, his negligence was no more 
than simple inadvertence and lack of ordinary care, for which 
lie cam10t be held responsible.'' (Italics supplied.) 
To the effect that suspicion and presumption are not suf-
ficient to establish a recovery in a case requiring proof of 
gross negligence, we invite the attention of the Court to, 
Grimstead v. Mayhew, 167 Va. 19, 187 S. E. 515, where it is. 
said that the rule in both civil and criminal cases: 
'' requires proof that rests upon facts and proper infer--
ences before there can be a conviction or a recoverv of dam-
ages. Siu,picion and vresumvtion are not sufficient. The-
fact that an automobile was traveling at an excessive rate 
of speed at a distance of a mile and a quarter from the place 
of the accident, while admissible on the ground of probative 
value, is not of itself sufficient to warrant the inference that 
such excessive speed obtained at the time of the accident. 
The bitrden was i1,pon, the plaintiff to show that Taylor 
25* was gi1,ilty of gross negligence which •»was the proxi-
mate c:aitse of the a,acident." (Italics supplied.) 
The frequently cited case of Young v. Dyer, 161 Va. 434,. 
170 S. E. 737, uses this approved lang·uage: 
'' A mere failure to skilfully operate an automobile under 
all conditions, or to be alert and observant, and to act intel-
ligently and operate an automobile at a low rate of speed 
may, or may not, be a failure to do what an ordinarily pru-
dent person would have done under the circumstances and 
thus amount to lack of ordinary care; but such lack of at-
tention and diligence, or mere inadvertence, does not amount 
to wanton or reckless conduct, or constitute culpable negli-
gence for which defendant would be responsible to an invited 
guest.'' 
Thelma Chappell v. Martha C. White. 
Cases following a similar line of thought are: 
Boggs v. Plybon, suvra. 
Jones v. Massie, 158 Va. 121, 163 S. E. 63. 
Osborn v. Berglund, 159 Va. 258, 165 S. E. 410. 
Thomas v. Snow, 162 Va. 654, 174 S. E. 837. 
Kent v. Miller, 167 Va. 422, 189 S. E. 332. 
Hawkins v. Sydnor, 170 Va. 267, 196 S. E. 619. 
White v. Gregory, 161 Va. 414, 170 S. E. ?39. 
19 
We are not unmindful of the fact that the issue of gross 
negligence has frequently been submitted to the jury for de-
termination and ,ve have, in our preparation of this peti-' 
tion, studied all of the opinions but in all of th~se cases 
which will no doubt be cited by our opponent, the physical 
facts have played an important part and the proven acts of 
the defendant have been what may be said to be radical in 
their nature. 
If we eliminate the alleged statement of the child there 
can be no assertion of gross negligence. If we accept as a 
fact that the child made some statement and that the state-
ment was properly admitted as a part of the res gestae, 
26* then exactly what did the child say? If the child merely 
asked *her mother to look at the mud on her shoe, and,. 
assuming further for the purpose of arg·ument that the 
mother did look at the child's shoe, do we have anything 
more than mere inattention which may be negligence, but 
which falls far short of that degree of · negligence which 
"shocks the conscience of fair-minded men"? If inattention 
of this type constitutes g-ross negligence, then it necessarily 
follows that all negligence is gToss negligence. Taking the 
plaintiff's case at its best and disregarding· the plaintiff's ac-
count of what the child said by inserting Mrs. Brown's recol-
lection of the statement and accepting all inferences there-
from, we have a case that might, under certain physical facts, 
depending upon the length of inattention, present an issue 
for the jury to decide. 
Will this Court permit an admittedly hearsay statement 
to be the subject of guess or mere conjecture as to what, if 
anything, this child said Y Should the jury be permitted to 
,Quess at random which one of these hearsay statements it 
should accept f We believe not and we are convinced that 
tbe facts of this case clearly illustrate the dang·er of accept-
ing any hearsay evidence even under the guise of a res gestae 
statement. 
This case falls within that type of accident which is so 
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unfortunate and is to be deeply regretted. It is also true, 
however, that the plaintiff, as a guest of her cousin, assumed 
certain risks, involved in travel by automobile, one of which 
is inattention. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS. 
Little need be said with respect to errors in granting and 
· refusing certain instructions as it is apparent that the 
27* major portion of the discussion *has already been cov-
ered. 
Instruction P-1 is erroneous for the :r:eason that it is per-
emptory in directing a verdict for .the plaintiff. It is ele-
mentary that an instruction directing a verdict must state 
a complete case and embrace all elements necessary to sup"'.' 
port a verdict. Thomas v. Snow, supra. The instruction as 
granted fails to use the words '' proximate cause"; it singles 
out the "failure to keep a proper lookout" as a guiding fac-
tor; it is confusing to the jury; it fails to define ~' gross ne·g-
ligence'' nor does it refer to any other instruction for a . 
proper definition of gross neglig·ence. 
Defendant's Inst:r:uction 5-D (refused) endeavored to par-
tially correct the omission in' Instruction P-1, but the Court 
refused 5-D on the mistaken theory that it had already been 
covered in 4-D. In none of the instructions submitted to · 
the jury was the issue of proximate cause raised. In none 
of the instructions was the status of the plaintiff defined as 
that of a "g'Uest". There was clearly nothing improper in 
Instruction 5-D; it correctly states the principle of law prop-
erly applicable thereto; it is not a repetition of Instruction 
4-D for the reasons hereinabove mentioned. 
Instruction 9-D was refused under the mistaken theorv 
that ''gross negligence'' was defined under 4-D. While thfs 
statement is substantially correct, the defendant was entitled 
to an instruction to submit to the jury "the state of mind,r 
the jury should take in viewing the question of gross negli-
gence. See Carroll v. Miller, supra. 
In the case of the refused In~tructions 5-D and 9-D, counsel 
volunteered to amend Instruction 4-D (granted) in order to 
insert the pertinent portions of the refused instructions. This 
request was refused. In this the Court was in error. 
28* •oONCLUSION. 
For the foregoing reasons and errors· assigned, petitioner 
prays that a writ of error and S'u,persedeas be granted from 
said judgment and that said judgment be reversed and a 
Thelma Chappell v. Martha C. White. 21 
final judgment entered in favor of your petitioner, or, in 
the event no final judgment is entered in favor of your peti-
tioner, that a new trial be awarded. 
Petitioner certifies that a copy of this petition was on the 
26th day of June, 1943, mailed to Tom E. Gilman, Esquire, 
Attorney for the plaintiff, Martha C. White. _ 
Petitioner states that this petition has been filed with the 
Honorable J. W. Eggleston, one of the Justices of the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, at his offices in Nor-
folk, Virginia. 
Iu the event this writ of error is granted, petitioner adopts 
this petition as her opening brief for plaintiff in -error. 
Counsel for petitioner desire to state orally their reasons 
for the reversal of these proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THELl\U. CHAPPELL, 
By BREEDEN & HOFFMAN, 
Her Attorneys. 
,v ALTER E. HOFFMAN, . 
Of Counsel. 
I, Edward L. Breeden, Jr., an attorney practicing before 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, with his 
29* offices in the National Bank of Commerce ,x,Building, 
Norfolk, Virginia, do hereby certify that, in my opin-
ion it is proper that the judgment complained of in the fore-
going petition should be reviewed and reversed by this Court. 
E.DW. L. BREEDEN, JR., 
An Attorney practicing in the Supreme Court 
o~ Appeals of Virginia. · 
Received June 28, 1943. 
J. W. E. 
·writ of error and supersedeas granted. Bond $9,000. 
JOHN W. EGGLESTON. 
Aug. 5, 1943. 
Received August 6, 1943. 
M. B. WATTS. 
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RECORD 
In the Circuit Court of Norfolk County, Virginia. 
Martha C. White 
v. 
J. W. Chappell an'd Thelma Chappell. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
. To Tom E. Gilman, Esquire, Attorney for Martha C. White, 
the Plaintiff: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 25th day of May, 
1943, at 3 o'clock P. M., at the courthouse of said County 
of Norfolk, Virg·inia, the undersigned will present to Hon. 
L. W. !'Anson, Judge of the ·Court of Hustings for the City 
of Portsmouth, Virgfoia, who sat for 1Hon. A. B. Carney in 
the trial of this case, stenographic transcript of the testi-
mony and other incidents of the trial of the above entitled 
cause in the Circuit Court of Norfolk County, Virginia, l\farch 
26, 1943, to be authenticated and verified by him; and will, 
on the same date, apply to the Clerk of said Circuit Court 
of Norfolk County for a transcript of the record in said 
cause, to be submitted to the Supreme Oourt of Appeals of 
Virginia with a petition for a writ of error and supersedeas 
from the final judgment entered in said cause. 
BREEDEN & HOFFMAl~, 
Attorneys for the Defendants. 
I 
Legal service of the above notice is he11eby accepted this 
25th day of May, 1943. 
TOM E. GILMAN, 
Attorney for Martha C. White. 
pag·e 2 ~ In tl1e Circuit Court of Norfolk County, Virginia. 
Martha C. White 
v. 
J. W. Chappell and Thelma Chappell. 
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RECORD. 
i, 
Stenographic report of the testimony and other incidents 
of the trial of the above entitled cause, tried in said Court 
on the 26th day of March, 1943, before Hon. L. W. !'Anson, 
Judge of the Court of Hustings for the City of Portsmouth, 
Virginia, sitting for Hon. A. B. Carney, Judge· of the Cir-
cuit Court of Norfolk County, Virg·inia, and a jury; together· 
with the motions and objections of the parties, the instruc-
tions to the jury, the ruling·s of the Court, the exceptions of 
the parties, and other incidents of the trial of said cause.· 
Appearances : Tom E. Gilman, Esquire, Counsel for the 
plaintiff. Messrs. Breeden & Hoffman, Counsel for the de-
fendants. 
Phlegar & Tilghman, 
'Shorthand Reporters, 
Norfolk-Richmond, Va. 
page 3 ~ 
VIRGINIA: 
RECORD .. 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of Norfolk C'ounty, at the-
Courthouse of said County, on the 25th day of May, 1943. 
Martha C. White, Plaintiff, 
v. 
J. W. Chappell and Thelma Chappell, Defendants. 
MOTION. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: on the 29th day 
of January, 1943, came the plaintiff, Martha C. White and 
filed her Notice of Motion ag·ainst J. W. Chappell and Thelma 
Chappell, in the words and figures following·, to-wit: 
To: J. W. Chappell and Thelma ,Chappell, 501 Loudon Street, 
Waterview, Portsmouth, Virginia. 
TAKE NOTICE, That plaintiff will on tl1e 1st day of 
March, 1943, move the Circuit Court of Norfolk County, Vir-
gfoia, for a judgment against you defendants, in favor of 
plaintiff, for Twentv-:five Thousand ($25,000.00) Dollars, dam-
ag·es, for this, to-wit: 
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That heretofore, to-wit, in July, 1942, plaintiff was a guest 
in an automobile operated and owned by defendants, and 
that said automobile was then operated iu such a grossly 
negligent, reckless and careless · manner that it was caused 
to leave the road and turn over, and by reason 
page 4 ~ thereof, plaintiff was . injured all over 4er person, 
w~s permanently injured, was caused to suffer pain 
and anguish, caused to spend sums of money on account of 
said injuries ; was caused to lose sums of money she would 
otherwise have earned. To the damage of plaintiff, $25,-
000.00. 
MARTH.A. C. WHITE, 
By TOM E. GILMAN, Counsel. 
January 25, 1943 . 
.And the return of the Sheriff of the County of Norfolk, on' 
the foregoing Notice of Motion, is in the words and figures 
following, to-wit: 
Not finding· J. W. Chappell at his usual place of abode I 
executed the within in the County of Norfolk, Va., this 27th 
day of Jan., 1943, by deliverin~ a copy hereof to his wife, 
Mrs. Thelma Chappell. She bemg then there, a member of 
his family and over the age of 17 years, and g·iving· informa-
tion of its purport to him. 
A. A. WENDEL, 
Sheriff, County of Norfolk, Va. 
By A. W. PRICE, Deputy. 
Executed in the County of Norfolk, Va., this the 27th day 
of Jan., 1943, by serving a copy hereof on Mrs. Thelma Chap-
pell in PERSON. 
A. A. WENDEL, 
Sheriff, County of Norfolk, Va. 
·By A. W. PRICE, Deputy. 
page 5 ~ And at another day, to-wit: the 16th day of March, 
1943, the plaintiff filed her bill' of particulars in 
the words and figures following, to-wit: 
Plaintiff comes and says that the defendants were grossly 
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negligent in the operation of their automobile in whi_ch plain-
tiff was a g11est ii:i that: · · 
They failed to have the automobile equipped with proper 
brakes and other safety devices. 
· They failed to keep a proper lookout. 
They failed to keep the automobile under proper control. 
They drove the same on the wrong side of the road, off 
the road, and into ditch. 
They drove the same at an excessive rate of speed. 
At the time of the accident the automobile was carrying 
guests on the front seat in excess of the number conducive 
to safety. 
And due to the said acts of negligence plaintiff was p~r-
manently injured, was injured all over her person, was caused 
to suffer pain and anguish, was caused to spend $2,000.00 in 
an effort to be healed of said injuries·; that her injuries con-
sisted of multiple bruises and contusions, her back was broken, 
her nervous system was disarranged, and she was paralyzed. 
MARTHA C. WHITE, 
By T·OM E. GILMAN, Counsel. 
page 6 r And at another day, to-wit: the 22nd day of-
March, 1943, came the defendants and filed their 
gTounds of defense in the words and fig·ures following, to-
wit: 
Defendants now come and state that they plead the Gen-
eral Issue to the allegations contained in plaintiff's notice 
of motion and bill of particulars in this case and will rely 
upon the same and all matters and things properly provable 
thereunder. · . -
And in addition thereto and by way of a further statement 
of their grounds of defense, allege as follows : 
1. That the plaintiff was a guest and that these defendants 
violated no duty owed her as such. 
2. That these defendants were not guilty of gross or cul-
pable negligence in fact or in law. 
3. That these defendants violated no duty imposed upon 
them by the provisions of Section 2154 (232) of the Code of 
Virginia. _ 
4. That further these defendants will rely upon any neg-
ligence of the plaintiff that may be shown upon the trial of 
this ·case as having contributed to plaintiff's injuries. 
26 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
5. And lastly they deny that plaintiff was permanently in-
jured. 
J. W. CHAPPELL and 
THELMA CHAPPELL, 
By BR~EDEN & HOFFMAN, p. d. 
page 7 ~ And on the same day, to-wit: the 22nd day of 
March, 1943, came the defendants and filed their 
affidavit of operatio~ agency or control, in the words and 
figures following, to-wit: 
State of Virg-inia, 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
This day personally appeared J. W. Chappell, who having 
been first duly sworn, made oath that the automobile which 
was being driven by his wife, Thelma Chappell, at the time 
of the alleged accWent of July 10, 1942, was neither operated 
or controlled by him, nor was his said wife acting· as his 
agent at the time of said accident. 
J. W. CHAPPELL. 




My commission expires July 19·, 1943. 
And at another day, to-wit: the 1st day of March, 1943, 
an order of court was entered in the words and figures fol-
lowing, to-wit: . 
This day came the plaintiff by her attorney and on his 
motion it is ordered that this case be docketed; and the de-
fendants appeared by Breeden & Hoffman, their attorneys, 
and pleaded "Not Guilty" to which the plaintiff replied g·en-
erally and on which plea issue is joined. 
page 8 ~ Note: The jury was sworn; all witnesses were 
told to come forward and be sworn, and were in-
structed by the Court to leave the courtroom. 
Opening statements were made by Mr. Gilman, on behalf 
of plaintiff, and by Mr. Breeden on behalf of the defend-
ants. 
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J. C. ROSE, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, having been first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: · 
Examined by Mr. Gilman: 
Q. Your name is J. C. Rose, is it not? 
.A. J. C. Rose. 
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Rose? 
.A. I live at Carrsville. 
Q. Aud how long have you lived in that section of the 
state? 
.A. I have been at Carrsville for 23 years. 
Q. And how far is that from Holland? 
A. Well, we call it, I think, about three and a half miles. 
Q. And I believe this accident happened between Holland 
and Carrsville 1 
A. That is right. 
Q. About•how far from your home? 
page 9 ~ A. Well, I should say three miles from home-
half mile of Holland. 
Q. I believe you are related by marriage to the plaintiff, 
Mrs. White, are you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how are you related to her? 
A. My wife and Mrs. ·White are sisters. 
Q. Is your wife also related to the defendants, the Chap-
pells Y 
A. A little .. 
Q. I believe that they had, among· others, visited your 
home, had they not? 
A. I think so. 
Q. What time did they leave your home, or did they leave 
vour home last before the accident or somewhere else? 
., A. I don't know whether they went somewhere else. I 
was not at the house, but I believe it was somewhere around 
four o'clock, or in the neig·hborhood of it. I was not there. 
Q. When did you first learn of the accident, Mr. Rose? 
A. Someone at Franklin near the hospital called up for 
the doctor and said Mrs. Chappell and all of them had gotten 
in to a wreck. 
Q. Did you go to the scene of the accident? 
A. Next day. 
Q. Were the marks on the road and on the shoul-
page 10 ~ der of the road the next day? 
A. Not on the right-hand side. 
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J. C. Rose. 
Q. There were no marks on the right-hand side Y 
A. I didn't see any. 
Q. Did you see the marks on the left-hand side where they 
went into the ditch T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And about how deep is that ditch that they drove into¥ 
A. It is five and a half or six feet deep where the car 
turned over. 
Q. Now, the road at that point is about how wide? 
A. Well, it is three lanes wide, but there is a right good 
shoulder on both sides; I should say as much as a six-foot 
shoulder on both sides. 
Q. And it is not what we call concrete but it is a kind of 
asphalt rough mixture on top Y . 
.A. It was a concrete road but there has been a black top 
put on it. . 
Q. The road last July was in the same shape as it is to-
day? · 
A. I think so. 
Q. Is there any drop-off on either shoulder from the hard 
s·urf ace to the dirt Y 
A. Not until you g·et to the ditch. 
page 11 ~ Q. Now, this accident, I believe, happened very 
near the home of Mr. Eure? 
A. Right in .front of his house is where the. car left the 
road. 
· Q. Did you measure the distance from the point on the 
right side of the road to where the car crossed and went to 
the left-the distance it traveled 1 
Mr. Breeden: The witness has testified that there was no 
marking on the rig·ht-hand shoulder, and he has said there 
were no markings on the .road. He has described certain 
marks on the left-hand side, and this was on a visit to the 
scene of the accident the day after. We object to his 
demonstrating to the jury where the car started from 
the right-hand side of the road and went to the left-hand side 
of the road. The evidence is purely speculative. 
The Court: Mr. Gilman, can't you identify these marks in 
some other manner 1 
By Mr. Gilman: . 
Q. You don't know where the car started from the right 
and went to the left-hand side? 
A. If you want tlle distance, it is 75 or 80 yards. 
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J. 0. Rose. 
Mr. Breeden: Your Honor, we object to letting this evi-
dence go to the jury for the impression it makes, and then 
find out that it has no foundation in law. 
page 12 } The Court: I do not think it is proper evidence. 
The jury will disregard the answer of the wit-
ness with reference to what be just said. 
Mr. Gilman: 
Q. What is the distance from the corner of the Eure fence 
(that is the corner at his driveway) to the point where the 
car left the road on the left side Y 
Mr. Breeden: We object to the question as irrelevant. 
There is no connection between the two. 
The Court : I sustain the objection. 
Mr. Gilman: Of course, it would not be proper evidence 
unless I connect it. 
The Court: I think you should connect it first. 
Mr. Gilman: All right, sir. 
Mr. Gilman: 
Q. Is there anything else you know a.bout the accident! 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. I will ask you this : The marks were on the left bank 
first, and they are there now; how far did it travel on the 
left shoulder before it turned over? 
A. I should say 25 or 30 yards. 
Q. That is after it crossed from the right to the left side, 
and traveled down the left shoulder! 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 13 ~ CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Breeden: · · · 
. Q. Mr. Rose, did yon notice whether there were two tracks 
or onlv one track on the left shoulder?· 
A. Two tracks. 
Q. · Two tracks on the left shoulder? 
A. Of course one side of the car was ·bearing on the shoul-
der some, and, before it turned over, two of the wheels left 
the shoulder and were clear . 
. · Q. And the first one track would have been made by the 
left-band wheels of the Chappell car, would it not? 
A. Well, they did both make some at first, but it got .where 
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J. C. Rose. 
you couldn't see but two, and how the car went that far 
without turning over I don't know and I don't see how any-
body knows. 
Q. If a four-wheel automobile admittedly goes off the left-
hand side of the road, the left-hand wheels of that car would 
make their marks on the shoulder :first, would they not 1 
A. Sure. 
Q. And that is the situation that you found when you ex-
amined the scene of this accident, is it not? 
A. Yes, sir; I saw where they all went, and they are there 
now. 
Q. Now, did you see a depression amounting to a hole or 
a gully, or wash-out, on that left shoulder ap-
page 14 ~ proximately a carlength from the point where the 
wheels :first left the highway Y 
A. Yes, sir. There were concrete pieces put there to try 
to hold the bank, to hold the road together. 
Q. And it was washed out in part Y 
.A. Yes, sir; it was washed out a little. 
Q. Did you measure the depth of that gully? 
A. I don't know that I did there, but I don't think it was 
over a foot deep where it went over. 
Q. You would state it was a foot or :fifteen inches deepf 
A. Something· like it. 
Q. And it was only past that gully that the two-wl1eel 
tracks were seen-that is, tracks made by both tlle right-
hand and left-hand wheels of the Chappell t 
A. I will not say after you passed that you saw the tracks 
of both wheels. 
Q. Immediately t 
A. I would not say that. It went some distance before it 
flopped over, and it got where you couldn't see the left-hand 
wheels on the left-hand side before it did turn over. 
Q. And would you say the place where this debris that you 
have described was about a carlength from the point where 
the wheel tracks first started Y 
A. It is more than that. 
page 15 r Q. Well, what would be your estimation of that? 
A. It is 25 or 30 feet before the car turned over, 
I am satisfied. 
Q. I am satisfied of that, too, but I mean where the :first 
twelve-inch depression was you described, how far was it 
from where the left-hand wheels first left the road t 
A. I reckon that would be something like the length of the 
car after it got off the concrete. 
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RE-DIRECT E,XAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gilman: . 
Q. The little wash-out you speak of is on the shoulder, h; 
it noU 
.A... Yes, sir. . 
Q. In other words, that little wash-out is about in the 
ditch? 
.A... · Yes, sir. 
Q. That is how far from the hard surf ace? 
A. The way the car was going, it was about the length of 
an automobile from the hard surface. 
Q. The hole was in the ditch bank itself? 
.A... It was nothing more than a wash-out from the con-
crete and had two rocks put in it to try to fill it. 
Q. I am talking about the location: It was right in the 
edge of the ditch? 
page 16 ~ A. It ran from the edge of the concrete into 
the ditch. The ravine where the rocks were was 
three feet from the concrete, and that ran to it. 
Q. How far was it-
Mr. Breeden: We object. 
Witness: It is three ieet or more, because they always re-
quire them to have a four-foot shoulder, and it was as much 
as three feet from the concrete. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Breeden: 
Q. Didn't you just say and isn't it a fact that this little 
gully that we have been talking about that was a foot or 
fifteen inches deep ran right up to the concrete Y 
.A... No, sir; I didn't say that. If I did, I am sorry that I 
misrepresented it. 
Q. Isn't it on the shoulder of the road¥ 
A. It runs from the concrete out to the shoulder, and they 
have put rocks in there to try to hold it four feet wide. 
Q. And it runs from the edge of the concrete? 
A. No; it don Jt run from the edge of the concrete, but the 
rocks. were put in the edge of the ditch, and there had beeu 
a little ravine there. That is the way I saw it. The road 
is level on the right-hand side, but, after you get 
page 17 ~ on the left-hand side, there is a mighty deep ditch 
there. 
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Q. I will have to. ask you to get a little more detail on 
that because the g·ully that we have talked about here, where 
the left front wheel of the Chappell car would have bounced 
down in it after it went off the left-hand side of the road, has 
been described by you (and I think accurately) as running 
from the edge of the concr~te; will you explain what you 
mean by ''the edge of the concrete,''-if you don't mean it 
runs out to it? 
A. I don't know that I said it ran to the concrete. There 
is a little ravine there, and there had been some rock put in 
it all the way out to try to keep the dirt and concrete to-
gether. When the car ran there, that is where they felt the-
first bump, and it went a good way before it turned over. 
Q. That bump that you say they first felt, did it run right 
up to the edge of the concrete¥ 
A .. I don't think so. I imagine the left-hand wheel ran 
three feet short of the concrete. 
Q. But it ran transverse to the shoulder of the road? 
A. There had been a drain, but they tried to fill it up to 
the hard surface. 
page 18 ~ J. M:. FANNY, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, having been: 
.first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Gilman: 
Q. State your name, Mr. Fanny. 
A. J. M:. Fanny. 
Q. And you reside just outside of Holland, do vou not 1· 
A. Yes, sir. w 
Q. And what is your business T 
· A. Automobile business, running a garage. 
Q. This accident to Mrs. Chappell 's automobile was about 
how far from your home? 
A. I would say about quarter of a mile or a little better 
than quarter of a m.iile. 
Q. Were you called up to the scene? 
A. Yes, sir. I was at supper at the time it happened·, and, 
when I went back to the garage, someone told me that there 
was a wreck down the road just beyond my house, and" I 
made the remark "I just backed out of the driveway and I 
didn't see any car'', and they said, ''One is d·own there in 
that deep culvert, and, if I were you, I would go and g·et it 
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out; there is no one with the car''. I took my service truck 
and went and got it. 
Q. How was it? 
A. Flat bottom up, with four wheels up in the air, just as 
straight as you could get it. 
page 19 ~ Q. That is a right deep ditch, isn't it Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Fanny, did you turn the car back on its tires¥ 
A. Yes, sir; I turned it over on its tires and towed it in. 
Q. Were the tires all right Y 
A. Yes, sir; the tires were all rig·ht; the body of the car 
was damaged, but the running works were all right so you 
could drive it on its wheels. 
Q. Did you drive it on its wheels after the accidenU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is the width of the road? 
A. It is a three-lane drive; I don't remember what it is, 
but about 40 feet, I reckon. 
Q. A perfectly straight road Y 
A. Yes, sir; perfectly straight. 
Mr. Hoffman: If the witness doesn't know the measure-
ment, I don't think he should guess at it. 
The Court: If he can give some idea of it. 
By Mr. Gilman: 
Q. It had been raining, I believe? 
. A. Yes, sir, a little before then. 
Q. Were any skid marks of any kind on that road, or brake 
marks¥ · 
A. I didn't see any. 
page 20 ~ Q. And you were there before night, weren't 
you? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Were there any marks of any kind on the right-hand 
side of the road, on the shoulder? 
A. On the right side I didn't see, but in the left-hand side, 
the way the car was coming·, the car had left the right side 
of the road and come over on the left, and traveled 25 yards 
on the dirt before it turned over. It was 25 good steps. 
Q. 25 stepsY 
A. Yes. 
Q. There is no drop off the road from the concrete to the 
dirt shoulder until you get way off, is there? 
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Mr. Hoffman: We object to leading the witness. 
The Court : Re-frame the question. 
Mr. Gilman: 
Q. What are the conditions of the road with reference to 
the elevation of the crown? 
A. Both sides are level until you get to this place; I would 
say maybe fifteen or twenty feet before the car turned over 
there is a deep culvert there. 
Q. That is the deep ditch Y 
A. Yes, sir, a ditch cut there for the swamp and that crosses 
there. 
page 21 ~ CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Breeden: 
Q. Can you tell us about the condition of the weather at 
that time? 
A. It had been raining before then just a little; it had not 
rained very much, but just a drizzle rain. 
Q. It had been drizzling for some time, enough to wet the 
road!· 
A. The road was a little damp. 
Q. And traffic had passed over that road? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And continuously passed over it? 
A. I g11ess so. 
Q. So, when you mentioned the absence of skid marks on 
the road, it might well be, if there were any, that they could 
have been blotted out by the wetn~ss of the road and the 
traffic on it? 
A.· Well, it didn't show any signs of any skid marks. 
Q. Now, Mr. Fanny, you live in the vicinity, I take it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Isn't it true that the road is 30 feet wide by actual 
tape measurement of it¥ 
A. I don't know, but it is a three-lane drive. 
Q. If I suggest that it is 30 feet wide and that 
page 22 ~ it has been measured, you would have no reason to· 
disag·ree with that width rather than 40 feet, as 
you testified Y . 
A. No, sir ; I wouldn '.t doubt your word. 
Q. That is approximately correct, is it not? 30 feet would 
be approximately correct, even from observation? 
A. I think so. 
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Q. Is that road slick when it is raining! 
· A. It is a black top gravel road, and it is not awful slick. 
Q. It is the type of road which does get slick sometimes 
when it rains 1 
A. Well, sometimes. 
Q. Are there any warning signs up "slick when wet"f 
A. No, sir; not on that road. 
Q. You have nothing to go on, or no evidence to give us, 
as to how the car got from the left-hand to the right-hand 
side of the road, have you Y 
A. No, sir ; I have not. 
Q. I mean from the right to the left¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Mr. Fanny, the ditch that the car went in was parallel 
to the road itself, was it not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, did you examine in detail the tracks that this 
car had made on the left shoulder T 
page 23 ~ A. Yes, sir; after I saw it, and it turned over 
like it did and I saw the tracks pulling off the road, 
I made the remark I couldn't see what in the world any-
body would drive on the side of the road and turn over for, 
and it went gradually from where they left the road to where 
it went into the ditch, approximately 25 steps. 
l\fr. Breeden: If your Honor please, I wish you would 
tell the jury to disregard his remark that he didn't see why 
somebody didn't do so and so. I don't think the jury is im-
pressed by it, but it is merely an expression of opinion on 
the part of the witness. 
The Court: It was an opinion of the witness and is not 
evidence a~d is not to be considered by you as such. 
Mr. Breeden : 
Q. Mr. Fanny, did you notice, and can you describe to this 
jury, the depression in the shoulder of the road, about a car-
leng·th from the point that the car left the highway, that ran 
at right ang·les to the road? 
A. That is on the left-hand side! 
Q. On the left side. 
A. That road, where the car crossed there, I imagine the 
shoulder of that road is about three and a half to four feet 
from the bottom of the big ditch that is on the left-hand side, 
and, just before this car turned over, there is a kind of hole 
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or wash .. out near the shoulder of the road where 
page 24 ~ it turned over. 
Q. That is on the shoulder of the road, isn't it f 
A. Yes, sir; it is on the shoulder of the road because the 
shoulder gradually grows narrower where it turned. 
Q. And the wheels had to g·o across that wash-ouU 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By :Mr. Gilman: 
Q. And that is some distance from the edge of the con- . 
crete, is it not? 
A. Yes, sir; it is around four feet. 
Q. And right in the edge of the ditch t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. This is a perfectly flat road, isn't it 0? It is not a crowned 
road? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Talking about slickness when raining·, it has been re-
covered and it is not perfectly smooth, is it'? 
Mr. Breeden: "'Who is testifying! 
l\f r. Gilman: I will change it. 
l\Ir. Gilman: 
Q. Describe the road. 
A. It is a black tar 11oad with this rough gTavel on it. 
Q. And it is not a slick road like concrete? 
page 25 ~ Mr. Breeden: I do not wunt to be jumping up, 
but counsel knows that this witness, who lives in 
quarter of a mile, can describe it without counsel's help. 
The Court: Suppose you re-frame it." 
:Mr. Gilman: I am through with him. 
TOME. EURE, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, having been first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
:mxamincd h v Mr. Gilman: 
Q. Mr. Eure, you live just beyond Holland, very near the 
point of this accident, do you noU 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Where were you at the time of the accident, Mr. Eure! 
A. I was sitting in my porch looking· at the funny paper 
on Sunday evening. 
Q. You saw the car before it went into the ditch, did youT 
A. If I seen it before it went into the ditch I didn't realize 
it. 
Q. What first attracted your attention? 
A. When they were hollering down there on the highway: 
Q. And did you go down there Y 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see the car from your front porch Y 
page 26 } A. Not after it went into the ditch, no, sir. 
Q. How far is it from vour front porch to the 
point of accident? . .. 
- A. I suppose about 100 yards. 
Q. You could have seen it if it had not been in the ditch? 
A. Oh, yes, sir; you could have seen it if it hadn't been in 
the ditch. 
Q. Did you immediately go down there? 
A. Yes, sir; just a~ soon as I heard the hollering I went 
on down there. 
Q. I believe it had been raining, had it not t 
A. I think it had been raining, but I don't tbink it was rain-
in.~· then. 
·Q. Mr. Eure, did you see the tire marks on the road where 
the automobile loft the right sido and went to the left-hand 
side? 
A. I didn't pay any attention when I went down there at 
all. 
Q. Did you afterwards see it Y 
A. I can't say I did. 
Q. Do you know ~here tlle car left from the right to the 
left of the road? 
A. I know where it l1it the left-hand side. 
page 27 ~ Q. Did it drive along gradually, or did it go off 
suddenlvT 
A. It kind of went off not exactly right suddenly, in my 
opinion, but it looked like it took a beeline like that (illustrat-
ing). 
Q. Do you know how fa1· it traveled? 
A. It traveled from where the wheel hit the dirt on the 
left-hand side right around 25 yards before it turned over. 
Q. You don't know how far it traveled from the right to 
the left shoulder before it turned over? 
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. A. No, sir. 
Mr. Breeden: I tllink that I1as been covered by the wit-
ness' testimony. 
. The Court : He' said be cloesn 't know. 
By l\fr. Gilman: 
Q. That is an upgrade there? 
A. I would call it a level road. 
Q. Going towa1~ds Holland from this point, I will ask you 
if it is not on an angle upgrade¥ 
Mr. Breeden: He testified it was level. I don't know 
whether counsel heard him, but I did. 
A. Along there it is level, but before you get to Holland it 
goes upgrade. 
page 28} CR.OS.S EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Breeden: · . 
Q. Mr. Eure, you could see the tire marks on this shoulder 
where they .went along· to where the car turned over f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was there any hole or rut in the shoulder where the 
wheel struck shortly after it went off the highway? 
A. I think there was a rut fifteen or twenty feet after it 
hit the shoulder. 
Q. How deep is that rut 1 
A. I believe twelve . or :fifteen inches deep, or somewhere 
between. 
Q. Does that rut start from the concrete and run out to-
wards the ditch? 
A. I think so. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gilman: 
Q. Do you mean the rut is at the edge of the concretef 
A. On the left but not on the right. 
Q. How far is the rut from the concrete? 
A. I haven't measured it, but it is not far, because a trac-
tor on the road g·ot sty.ck there and left it there. 
Q. I am not talking about the tractor, but I want to Irnow 
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how fur the little rut you speak of is from the 
page 29 ~ edge of the concrete T 
A. I imagine it would be ~ix to eight inches. 
Q. It ha.s moved since you and I looked at it? 
A. I don't know. The rut is right there, but if it goes up 
to the concrete I will not be certain. 
Q. How wide is the rut? 
A. I don't know, but I suppose eight or ten inches. 
Q. And that is at the edge of the ditch bank¥ 
.A. It is on the edge of the shoulder of the road. 
Q. And how far does the ditch bank start down from the 
rut? 
A. From the rut going down T 
Q. Yes. . 
.A. I suppose that the rut goes out to the edge of the ditch. 
Q. Then the rut· is on the edge of the ditch bank or the 
ditch Y 
A. Yes, sir; it goes from the concrete .right down to the 
edge. 
PE-GGY CHAPPELL., 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff., having been first duly 
sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined bv Mr. Gilman: 
Q. Your name is Peggy Chappell, is it not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 30 ~ Q. And this is your mother and your father here, 
Pegg'Y? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Talk so these gentlemen can hear you. How old are 
you, Peggy? 
A. Eight years old. 
Q. Do you go to school? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What grade are yon in? 
A. Third. 
Q. Were you with your mother and other friends the clay 
of this accident last summer Y 
.A. Sir? 
Q. I say, were you in thei automobile with your mother aud 
others when the automobile turned over last summer? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q . .And where were you sitting, Peggy? 
A. I was in the middle in the front. 
-1, .• 
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Q. The middle on the front seaU 
A. Ye$, sir. 
Q. You were cqmfng home, I }?elieye? 
~. Yes, sir. 
Q. On which side of the road were you driving T 
A. The_ right side. · · 
Q. The right side? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 31 ~ Q. What did yqur mother do which caused her 
to run across the road aud into the ditch f 
A. I don't kuow. 
Q. What did you say before she ran into the ditch Y 
Mr. Breeq.eij: 'rhis witness can't testify to that. 
r_J:1he Court: You h~d better reframe it. 
}Ir. Gilman: 
Q. Was there anything· said by your mother before she 
went across the road? 
A .. Before I got from the 4ighway from the house that I 
was coming put, I g.ot mud on · my shoes before I got to the 
highway. 
Q. And then you got i:q.to the automobile? 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did tpp muµ on your s4oes have to do with the 
accident? 
l\fr. Breeden: I don't think it had anything to do with it, 
vour Honor. 
· The Court: Let her go ahead. 
Mr. Gilman : 
Q. v\7bat did the mud you got on your shoes have to do 
with the accident? "r as your mother getting the mud off-? 
A. What? 
Q. Why did you mention mud? What connection has mud 
to do with the accident? · · 
l\Ir. Hoffman: You mentioned it, Mr. Gilman. 
page 32 ~ l\Ir. Gilman: She mentioned it first, that wl1e11 
she c~me from the place she got mud. · 
Mr. Gilman: . 
Q. I would like to know 'Yhat the mud h~d t.o· do. with .the 
ttcc.iclent ¥ · · 
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A. I don't know. 
Q. W~y d~d you menti.<!n t?e mud~ 
. 
'Xhe Court : I understood you mentioned it. 
Mr. Breeden: He did mention it. - . 
Mr. Gilman: I will not ~~ke any point who mentioned it., 
but I apl as~ing what conll-~ctiori the mud h~d with the acci-
dent. · · ' · 
Mr. Gihnan: 
Q. What? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Well, just before your mother went from the right side 
~nd cro~s~.d the three-lane drive, ,y}lat di.d you say to her, if apything Y · · · · · · 
A. 1t wa!:3 so quick I diq;n't have time to s~y anything. 
Q. I am not talking about the time it went into the ditch, 
but before you left the right side of the road and went down 
the shoulder; before you left your right side, what did you 
sav to h~rf 
A. Nothing. 
Q. What did you say at the time .of the accident about what 
she had said Y · 
A. SirY 
.pag~ 33 } Q. 1,t11at did you eay at the time of the ~ccident ¥ 
Mr. Breede:n: I think the child has testified that she didn 7t 
say· anything: to her mother before the car started to. skid, or 
regardless-
Mr. Gilman : She didn't say ~kiq.. You are the only per-
son who used the word today. · 
Mr. Breeden: Counsel int~rrupted me. Th~ chilc;:1 has tes-
tified that she didn't say anything to her mother before the 
.car skidded-
l\fr. Gilman: I am asking a different question. 
l\fr. Breeden: Your Honor, I think I have the right to 
state my objection and complete it. 
The Court: Go ahead. 
Mr. Breeden: The child has testified that she had not 
said anything before the car skidded or regardless of how it 
p;ot on the other side of the higl,way, nor did she say any-
thing durin,2: the process of that happening. Now, counsel 
has proceeded to the next step of asking the child something 
after the accident happened, and we are objecting to that. 
'rli~ QQ\Trt; I think, Mr, Breeden, he can ask what she 
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said, if anything, after the accident happene~ if that is a 
part of the res gestae. 
Mr. Breeden: If it is. I think, if your Honor please, this 
involves a matter that the Court can hardly pl;lss 
page 34} on properly without first hearing· what the child 
may have said, if anything, and, for that reason,. 
I ask that the jury be excluded and have the Court pass on it 
knowing what the evidence is rather than having· something 
improper discussed in the presence of the jury. 
The Court : All right. Gentlemen of the jury, just step 
into the room. 
( The jury retired from the courtroom.) · 
Mr. Breeden: Now, if your Honor please, I am going to 
refrain from any objection, and let the Court hear whatever 
the ehild may have to say regardless of what the child may 
say. 
Mr. Gilman: 
Q. W11at was it you said when it went into the ditchY 
A. I didn't say anything. 
Q. You didn't say anythingf 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What did you say when the car turned over, after it 
went into the ditchT (Pause). You need not look at your 
motl1er and father, but just- tell us. 
A. Well, they were all hollering and all like that, and I 
was not saying anything·. They were hollering and all like 
that. 
Q. You didn't say that your-
page 35 ~ Mr. Hoffman:. He is trying to contradict his 
witness. 
Mr. Gilman: Well, I can prove it by someone else. I am 
not bound by a solitary witness but I am bound by the plain-
tiff's testimony. I am not layina: any foundation to contra-
dict her, but I will call other witnesses as to that fact. 
· T.he Court : I presume there is nothing to go in before 
the jury as the result of l1er statement here T 
Mr. Gilman: No. 
The Court: All right; let the jury come back. 
( 'rhe jury ·returned to the courtroom.) 
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Bv Mr. Gilman: 
-Q .. Who else was on the front seat with you, Peggyt 
A. My mother and my brother. 
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Q. Your brother was to the right, and you were in the 
middle? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Gilman: .All xight. 
Mr. Breeden:· Come down, Peggy; that is all. 
page 36 ~ MRS. :MARGARET F. BROWN, · 
a witness on behalf. of the plaintiff, having been 
first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by l\fr. Gilman: 
Q. State your name, please, Mrs. Brown 7 
A. Margaret. 
Q. Where do you live t 
A. 1401 Kinston .A.venue. 
Q. How are you related to the plaintiff, Mrs. White? 
A. She is my mother's first cousin. You can figure what 
that is. 
Q. How are you related to the defendant? 
A. The same relation. 
Q. You are the same relation to J,:>oth the plaintiff and the 
defendant? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. I believe you were on this trip the day of the accident Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was that the first time you had been there \With Mrs. 
Chappe11, 
A. -The first time I had been with her driving. 
Q. Where were you sitting-! 
A. On the left rear seat. 
Q. And who else was on the rear seat with you Y 
A. Mrs. White was sitting next to me, ancl Mrs. 
page 37 ~ Rowe ne:x,t to her, and my baby had been standing, 
but a few seconds before the accident I was plac-
in~ her in my lap. 
Q. And you were sitting right behind the driver., Mrs. 
Cliappell? 
A. Yes. 
Q. About how fast were you traveling just before the ac-
C'iclent, do you know, Mrs. Brown f 
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A. ,v el~,: I wQuld ~ot i;my. speeding·, and I wo:uldn 't say go-
ing very slow, but my opinion is we were going between 40 
and 45. , . . . .. . 
Q. You drive an automobile, do you¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, tell us what you observed and what yo·u saw or 
heard. : · .. . . 
A. vV'ell, tl;i¢.first _thing, w~ wer~ all getting.settled be~ause 
we had left their relatives not very long, and, in getting my 
baby settled, l was, not paying any attention to the road at 
a.lJ; and th.~_fi1:~t I heard Mrs. ;Chappell said, '~Oh," and she 
had her head in this position. (illustrating)., _and wa~ raising 
her head like this, and she turned to grab the wheel. 
Q. You are sitting· there. as if sitting in the driver's seaU 
A. Yes, sir ; I w~s djrectly b~hind h~r.. . 
Q. You say you saw her getting up in this posi-
page 38 ~ tion and grab the wheel f 
A. She had her head turned. 
Q. Tutn~d whi~h.W~Y1. 
A. 'furned .to the right. 
Q. Down or up? 
A. Down to a certMn angle. 
Q. And that is wliat you noticed when you heard her say, 
"Ohf':'. 
A. Yes, sir. As she said that, I iooked up. 
Q. And yon say that she also grabbed the wheel then? 
A,; Sh~ grabbed the wheel and pulled it to her right. 
Q. Did you see her put her hand on the wheel.? . 
.A. I dion 't s~e th~ wheel down here, but I did see the hand 
as it grabbed the wheel. 
Q. You saw her right lu~nd as. it grabbed the wheel 1 
A. Yes, sir; I saw the right hand as tt grabbed _th~ wheel. 
Q. You don't know what she was looking to the right and 
clown about? 
A. No; I can't say positively, but I can say positively that 
]1e1~ liand was clown. 
Q. YOU saw· the mOV'<?Illent coming to the wheel f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then what happened·? 
A. Well, to my feeling, the way the car felt to 
page 39 ~ me as she grabbed the wheel, she was so far on 
. the len-hancl side of the roaq. there w~s no. room 
fol· the car to give, and as it gave the rear wh~el continued 
off the concrete and on the shoulder and down over. 
Q. It was so far over at that time sl1e could not get back? 
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''· . \ .. 1, . ' ' . '·. . . ' . . •.· . 
A. She was still on the road, but it was only a few inches. 
Q. To what? _ -. , .· . 1. , • 
. ~:- .To1 th.e left. Jn othei\ _wo~·ds:, ~}:le :wa~ on· the left~~d 
side j'ust as far as she could possibly have driven and been 
safe. . . • . . . . . . .. . .·. . . . . . . 
.- Q~ :J3ef 01:e you 4ea~d the exclamation "Oh,'' was there any 
skic;lding Qf tlµ.~ auto~ob,ilet . . , . . . . , 
A. ~here was no attention called to any impending acci-
dent at ~u .. : . . . . ' . . . . . . . 
. Q. Was there any bump· of any kind before this· exclama-
tion! .. , : t . •. • 
A. No._; notph)g~" We wei;e. getting settled, and there was 
no definite discussion or anything. . . 
. Q~ la~ ),lot, t,µting about_:_diseussion. Was there any bump 
or skiddJng of the automobile? 
-t,i.. ~o~ .. .. . ,. . . .·: , . . . ·, i .• ·.:.. .i ..• 
Q. The exclamation ''Oh'' was the first thing that attracted 
your attention! ". 
page 40 } A. The first thing that attracted my att~ntion 
that anything· was wrong.. . ·. . . 
Q. ¥ 011: we:nt o~ ~qwn ancJ.. turned over; what did the little 
girl say when you turned overt 
l\!ir. ~.ree<;l~n : .. Yp,;ir }{9n9,r, .. _w~. object. That is the s~me 
testimonv tbat we have dealt with. 
The Court: I sustain the objection. 
Mr. Gil,wm1: It isa P.art .of the res gestae.. . ·. . ·. 
Mr. Hoffman: vYe are preparecl to argue it, if your Honor 
ple~s~. . . . . . . 
, Th~ Co-qrt:. All right, gentlemen.. Suppose you step into 
the jury room. 
(The jury 1·etired from the courtroom.) 
1\lr'. Hoffman: If your Honor please: . in the :ijrst :e.Iace, I 
tllink Mr. Gilma11 s110uld find out from Mrs. Brown when the 
cl1ilc1 macle any statement, and tben I will be very glad to 
<1rg1ie it. . . . 
The Court: That is verv material. I understood from 
Mr. Oilman's question that it was ''What did the little girl 
sav,- when the automobile turned over?" Is that correct? 
. i\fr. Gilman: I don't know, but I will get definitely what 
time it was. 
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page ·41 f. Q. I believe you stated, or someone Ilasr t4a t 
the car tnrned bottomside up r 
A. In the ditch .. 
. Q .. When did the little girl make this exclamation in point 
of. timer 
A. What I heard was-I don"t know whether anvbodv else 
heard it-what I heard was after we were out of the car~ 
<My baby got out first, and Mr~. Ro~e got out second, and I 
got out third, and Peggy, the little girl, got out.. Peggy was 
screaming, "What will Daddy sayY What will Daddy say! 
If Mother hadn't .been g·efting mud off my shoe, it wouldn't 
Iiave happened/' .. , . . · 
Q. And that was as soon as yon had gotten out of tbe-
car Y 
A. We were up on the highway. We had to get out in, 
order to attr.act attention, as there was no one there. 
Q. Just answer the question. It was just as soon as you 
got out of ~e car!' 
A. Yes,. sir. . 
The Court: 
Q .. How fo~g did it take you to g~t · out of the automobil~ 
after the acc1dentf 
A. That is hard to say because, in a way, it seemed ages, 
but I would say between ten and fifteen minutes, the best I 
can say. 
pag'"e 42 r The Court ~ All right, Mr. Hoffman, I will 
hettr "\Tot1. 
Mr. Hoffman:" If your Honor please, I think Mrs. Brown's 
last comment is V'ery pertinent, that this statement of the 
child occurred between ten and fifteen minutes after the ac-
cident. There is a case of Ellis v. Virginia Railway ct Power 
Co1npa1'iy, 132 Virginia, 24: · · 
(Counsel theri a:rgued the objection, citing authorities.) 
The Court: 
Q. Row long did. it take you to get out' of the automobile 
after it was turned over 1 · 
.A.. 1 would say it was ten or fifteen minutes because I 
beard Pegg-y say it as soon M we were out, and it was the 
Ieng-th of time the car was wedged and Mrs. Rowe tried to 
push tl1e door .into the d!tch bank, and I helped her to get 
out, and we raised the wmdow and I put my baby through, 
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and as soon as my baby got through Mrs. Rowe went through 
and I got through and Peggy was right behind me. As soon 
as she got out is when I heard it., and that is why I judge it 
was that long. 
The Court: I will admit it, gentlemen. 
l\ir. Hoffman: In its entiretv? 
The Court: Yes, as to the., mud on the shoe, but not as 
to the opinion of it being her fault-
page 43 ~ ·witness:· I didn't say that. 
Mr. Breeden: We except . 
. Mr. Hoffman: Your Honor had better get straight with 
this witness now: Our motion is two-fold; i~ the first place, 
to exclude _it entirely, and, in the second place, to exclude 
Ruch portion of it as in any way expresses an opinion. . 
Mr. Gilman: I agree with you on the opinion. I do not 
think it proper evidence. Mrs. Brown didn't state anything 
that the child f:aid it was her fault, but you can state what 
was said about the mud and the shoe. 
The Court: Confine ·your statement as to that. 
'Mr. Hoffman: We would like to point out that Mr. Gilman 
is trying to contradict one of his own witnesses. We except 
on that ground also. 
The Court: All right. Let the jury come back. 
( ~he jury returned to the courtroom.) 
Bv Mr. Gilman: 
·Q. Mrs. Brown, when you turned over, just state tl1en what 
happened? Were you wedged in there? 
A. We were completely wedged. The side I was on was 
dark becam;c the ditch hank rovered it; we could only see a 
shadow of light. Mrs. Rowe tried to push the door into the 
ditch bank to g·et out, she couldn't. I crawled 
page 44 ~ over Mrs. White to help get her foot out, and we 
raised the window 1~p and my baby went through, 
and Mrs. Rowe went through. 
Q. ·As soon as you got out on the ditch bank and Peggy 
e:ot out, what did she sav? 
·· A. She said, wwhat ·is Daddy going to say? What is 
Daddy going to sayT Oh, Lord, what is Daddy going to sayY 
If Mother hadn't been gettjng mud off my shoe, it would not 
have happened.'' 
48 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Mr;s. Margaret F. Ifrown. 
:M:i·. Hoffman: Th~ same obJection, your Honor. 
Mr. Breeden: It ie an opinion. 
The Court : All right. 
1'Ir. Breeden: Exception. 
By Mr. Gilman;. . . , 
Q. Was she· excited nnd .crying? . 
A. Yes, sir; all the children were excited. 
Q. The:µ I believe a little later a bus came along and you 
all were carried to Franklin? 
A. Yes~ ·sir. 
Q. Carried to the l1ospital f 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bre~d~n: , . 
Q. )frs. Brown, that. was ten or fifteen minutes after the 
· · accident had happene.dY . 
page 45 ~ A. After the actual turning over. That included 
the time of getting out of the, car. . . 
:Mr. Breeden: Your Honor, we wish it understood. that 
this cross examination is without waiving objectio~s. . 
The Court: Yes. I think the jury should be told that the 
opinion of the little child is not to be taken by you as evidence, 
~:entlemen. 
Bv .. Mr. Breeden: 
. Q. l\frs .. Brow;n, l believe you have testified, just prior to 
]1earing; the remark of ''Oh" froni Mrs. Chappell, vou had 
been µ:etting· yo1;1.r litU~ hoy up on ypur lap?. · . 
A. Yes,. a·ftcr rai~ing him and sitting him on my lap. 
Q. And I think that yoti further used the expression it 
was just a few seconds from that moment until the accident 
happencdf 
.A. Ye$. 
Q. A few moments before the accident happened 0/ 
A .. Yes .. 
Q. Now, before that., Mrs. Brown, hadn't. you been riding 
lcokin~· forward f 
A. I can't say I was watching the road at all. 
Q. Did you know· which side of the road Mrs. Chappell wns 
drivin~ her car on f -
A. Do rou mean before the accident or at what time? 
I.'.,' 
!jl 
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page 46 } A. Naturally, when she left sbe was on the right 
side, but, when the accident ;happened, she was on 
the~ left. . "· , , , · · .. r 
: · Q. You don't know· how it got over there 1 
A. No; I was not lookb;1g at the road, and that was the 
iirst I realized something was wrong. · : . . 
Q. And you have no recollec.tioh of anything .happening at 
all that would tell us how tp.e car got f.rom the .right-hand 
side of the road, where it had been only; a few seconds before, 
until wl1en. you said you looked up· an·t1 were on the left-;-hand 
side of the road? · . · ,, , · 
.A.. No; I have ·no ·recollec'tion of the movement of ,the car. 
Q. Do yo.u lmow how .wide that ,road.is? . i • 
A. I:would not lik~ to- ·s~y, but my opinion is that it is a 
three-lane ·-hig·liway; whatever width that constitutes. 
Q. If I would tell you the road was thirty if eet wide, would 
you say· tha;t 'is· appioximately correct? 
A. To be frank with you, I don't know the width of the 
lan~s and couldh 't tell .vou. . . · . . . . , . · 
.. Q. You would not say? 
A,.. No~ All I can say is I judge it was a three-lane high-
-way. • I 
Q. Are you an .authority on speed? 
A. Well, I have been driving about twelv.e or 
page 47 } thirteen years. 
Q. And you can judge the speed, but you can't 
judge the width ,of the road t 
. A. I gu~ss I never minded enougb for that.· 
Q. Mrs. Chappell had been driving that car perfectly 
normally just prior to \he accident., hadn't she.Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. You don't lmow which side of the road she· was on; was 
there anything to indicate that slie had gone off-
. A. She had been on the right a short while. We had only 
p:one three or four miles, and there was nothing in that short 
time. . . 
Q. Had Mrs. Chappell been talking with you, or with Mrs. 
'White, or with Mrs. Rowe-with any of you three· ladies on 
the back seat? 
A. There was no immediate· conversation, I would say, di-
rected to any one person. There was jabbering, . but there 
was no direct conversation at the time. 
Q. Did you hear Mrs. Chappell make any remark at any 
time prior to the time she said '' Oh 1 '' 
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A. No. As I told you, we were all busy gettino- settled, 
and there was· nothing to call attention that anything was 
wrong. . . . 
Q. Nothing to call attention to anything tbat was wrongt 
A. No, or to anything else. We· were letting her 
page 48 ~ attend to the road, and we were in the back. 
Q. Did you hear any of the children on the front 
seat say anything·T . 
A. Do vou mean before the accidentf 
· Q. Yes; before the accident Y 
A. No; r· did not. 
Q .. Did you observe-uncl I believe yon. I1ave really an-
swered this-any movement on Mrs. Chappell 's part at all 
prior to the expression ''Oh?'' · 
A. I didn't have my eyes, on the· front seat; I was attend-
ing to my child, and I didn't have my eyes on the front seat. 
Q. When Mrs. Chappell said "Oh'' you were already over 
on the left-hand side of the road but still on the hard paved 
surf ace of the road Y 
A. We were still on, but we were just on enough to say 
that we were on, and that is all. In other words, ii she hadn't 
looked when she did,, I think we would have been in the ditch 
without her realizing it. 
Q. Mrs. Brown, are you not saying that without really 
knowing it; if you hadn't noticed what she was doing, or how 
she was looking-, during the bri~f second when she said'' Oh?'' 
A. Do yon mean how far she was over there? 
Q. You said if she had not Jooked. 
page 49 ~ A. I mean that she was so far over, if another 
second had occurred before she realized something 
was wrong, sl1e would have been in the ditch. "· 
Q. We want to know what you ·saw, what you heard, and 
what vou observed as to the facts? 
A. As I said before, lier exclamation was the first sign to 
me that she knew it. 
Q. And you don't know if she had been there a split sec-
ond, or whether she had been over there a full minute Y 
.A. No. As I sai.d, the fi:rst I realized was when she said 
it, and she was in the act of lookin!?,· up. 
Q. When you beard that expression, ,1ou realized that dan-
Q:er was imminent? - · .. 
· A. Yes. 
Q. And you had this ·child with you f . ) 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you naturally were concerned a.bout the saf~ty of 
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the child, and; we might go further, they were all relatives 
of yours in· the car? . . . . 
.A .. Yes.- :: :· · · · ~ · · · ·' ·· · J. · • 
Q.· You would not want any harm to happen to any of the~!._ 
A .. No. · · · . - . · · ·-
Q-. And the ·next thing, the· accident happened, I believe 
you said, in a second 1 · · : · · · · · · · 
A. Sure; it all happened simultaneously . 
. Q. Simultaneously? 
page 50 ~- A. Yes. 
· · · ··· : Q. And you saw_ Mrs. Chappell, you _say, mov:e 
her harid t · ' · · .· · · · · · · ·· · · · · · · 
A. I saw her in the act of grabbing. I didn't see it down 
here,' but I did see· her grabbirig. · · .· · · · · ·· · · 
Q. As a matter of fact, you. can't see through the back of 
the front -seat 1 · · ·· .. · 
A. No, but you can=·see anybody's a.i'm. 
~- Where was hei· .hand f "X ou say you saw it move fro 
One position to the' othed . ' I • • . • '. • ' 
A~ I didn tt see the other position, but I saw it as it grabbed 
the wheel. · · · · 
Q. The. right h3:nd you refe1~ to f 
1 
• • • • • 
A. Yes; 'the right hand. . .. · . . · · . ' 
Q. ·The movement .of that hana may have been from the 
botto:rn o~ th~ __ w~eel,.to the, t~p ?f ~~, fo.r the ~urpos.e pf cutting 
the car· to tlie right? 
.A.. I don't know where it ~ame from. I can't say as to 
that. l f • I • : • ' • , ,. • 
Q. Do you Know where her 'left. hand waf:j' . . , 
A. No ; I can't . say I knpw _w.h~r..e h~r: left hand w.as. . · 
Q. With respect to. t~e movemenl of her head, you say she 
moved he.r head from a position slightly ,down to the right f 
· · .A.. Yes. . . .. ~ .. · n ., 
page . 51 ~. Q. That was after she said,;' '-Oh'' Y 
' · -~ A. No; .it was at the_ time she.. said, .u.oh''., be-
cau~e it was all. like tha~.. .:A.s .she s~id,. '' Oh ,.i, T looked .up. 
Q. Do I. und~!stand. yq_u . heard h~r say, .. ' 'Oh''; and you · 
look_ed up, and you -~-~ught h~er so quick -before. she. looked Y • 
At She could ·h~ve _ cut her, eyes ; if you realize something 
is wro~g,_ you can cu~. your eyes before you ·move the body. 
Q. Did she move her body t 
A. No; she moved her head. Her body was twisted to a 
certain extent. 
Q. You were hurt in this accident, too, weren't you Y 
A. Yes. 
/ 
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Q. And you have an injury which you make claim for, too, 
haven't you f 
A. Yes. 
DR. J. ·W. ABBITT, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, having been first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Gilman: 
Q. Your name is Dr. J. W. Abbitt, and you are a practicing 
physician with offices in the City of Portsmouth, I believe 1 
A. Yes. 
page 52 ~ Q. Are you treating Mrs. White, or is she under 
your professional care T 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have had.her how long! 
A. I don't know, but since she -came back from Franklin. 
Q. Since she returned from the hospital f 
A. Yes .. 
Q. She was in the hospital at Franklin, I believe? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was her condition then and what is it now? 
A. Her condition then was partial paralysis of the legs. I 
did not see the X-rays taken in Franklin, but the doctor up 
there sent me a letter stating· that she had a fractured verte-
bra at the time, and she had partial paralysis of both legs, 
and, at the present time, she has improved some but she 
still has partial paralysis, but she can get around with the 
aid of her crutch and cane. 
Q. What does your treatment consist of now Y 
A. Sedatives and rest. 
Q. Why do you g·ive her sedatives? "What is that for? 
A. For pain. . 
Q. And is that about all you can do for her now-to give-
her something for her pain? 
A. That. is about the only treatment that you can give ex-
. . cept massage, which the nurses have been doing. 
page 53 ~ Q. There is nothing further medical science can 
do for her! · 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. What is reasonably the probable future condition f . 
A. I think the paralysis will be permanent. 
Q. And what is paralysis Y What do you mean by thaU 
How does it affect one? · 
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A. When she has paralysis she cannot use her leg, and it 
is the tesult of injury to the spinal cord. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Breeden: 
Q. Doctor, she has had very able attention professionally! 
A. I think so. 
Q. And her condition has improved from week to week 
or from month to month 1 
A. T-here has been slight improvement since she has been 
home, but she has · not improved very much. 
Q. These fractures are pressure fractures 1 
A. The pressure, if it -is relieved, it will come back. 
Q. Is·-it a progressive thing? . 
A. It is not progressive~ 
Q. Will it not improve as times goes on f 
· A.· If the cord is severed it will not, but if it is 
page 54 } injure<;! it will. . 
or noU 
A. No. 
-Q~ You don't know whether the cord is severed, 
Q. The fact that there has been improvement, doesn't that 
indicate that there is not a severance of the joints f · 
A. You get a certain amount of improvement when the in-
flammation and pressure is relieved. 
. MARTHA -C. WHITE, . 
the plaintiff, having ·been first duly sworn, testified as fol-
lows: · · 
Examined by Mr. Gilman: 
Q. State your name, Mrs. White, please. 
A. Martha C. White. 
Q. Talk a little louder. You live where? 
A. 1900 Deep· Creek Boulevard. 
Q. Now, Mrs. White, how long have you lived on Deep 
Creek Boulevard? 
~- 27 years. 
Q. And your husband's name is what? 
A. Eugene C. White. 
Q. Is he. living Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What business was he in before he died T 
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A.. The dairy· business. 
page 55-}- · Q. Mrs. White, ~o'Y .. ~re you· refat~d · to Mrs .. 
Chappell; the def eildant Y 
A.· First cousin~: . .. . 
Q.' On this day ·.yoti were visiting friends ·aud relatives; is 
that true? 
A.·Yes: . _ .; ..... 
Q. Now;··where were you sitting in the automobile at the 
time· of or j.ust hefore the accic1~n~Y. 
A. In the center on the rear seat. · 
Q~ Now,_t'ell th~· .Court an~ jury i.n your O"\yn\iayj-qst what , 
happened on th~-- return trip, and speak a httle louder, 
please. .·., . . . . . _ 
A. Well, ~verything happene9- · ~o quick th~t w~ :b·ardly ~ 
knew anything until the car was turned over, and _it was prac-
tically off the road almost when I saw somethtng was wrqng, 
and, of course, I looked and ~rs .. Chappell :w~s rai_sh1g. up .. · 
·Of course she . was not sitting up straight as· one should be 
at the" wheel.. . ,I 1··, r : : (' :. · 
Q. What was t¥,at y<;>u said .a~out .fhe _ wheel Y · , · . · 
A. She was not sitting straight at the wheel, like a diiver 
should be, before she straig·htened up. . , ) ·. 1 : Q~ When you say that ~he was straightening up when you 
saw her, w~s that before the. accident!· -- : - , :: . 
A. Yes, sir; '¥hen 1  noticed something. was wrong. 
. . , Q. That is wl}en you saw her raising up Y 
pag·e 56 }- A. Yes, sir. 
. Q. Thell what happened? , .. , 
.A,., !he.car. turned over on the side, and then went several 
feet-I don't know, of course, I was so scared, I didn't-realize 
how far it was going but it turned completely over. 
Q. On its top? . . . . . . .. 
A. On its top.. Then I .was unconscious. I didn't know 
it ever turned over for a week after,-I don't know how many 
weeks. Mrs. Chappell- went to Franklin and- told me, and 
that was -the first I knew the .. -car .turned,.clear over·.· ·, 
Q!. Pid Y9.U · regain consciousness after· the accident before 
you were removed f 
A. I laid there in the car a good many minutes before any- · · 
body could get me .out, and J. could see the child, and slie · · , 
said,.."Oh, Mamma, what is Daddy goingdo sayf."· What is 
· Daddy going to sayY I was the whole cause ·of it.'' . 
Mr. Hoffman: We object to that. 
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The Court: As to "the whole cause of it", that was an 
opinion, and, g·entlemen, do not consider it. 
By Mr. Gilman: 
Q. Then what? 
A. She said, "If I hadn't told Mother to look down at my 
foot, it would not have happened". 
Mr. Breeden: It is not what the driver said, 
page 57 ~ but what the child said, and that goes to our state-
ment as to the other. 
The Court: So far as the statement which expressed an 
opinion of the child, it is not to be regarded. 
Mr. Gilm&n : As to the looking down. 
:Mr. Breeden: The witness has not said about looking 
down. 
By Mr. Gilman: 
Q. As the result of that accident, you were injured Y 
A. Yes. _ · 
Q. And you were carried to the Franklin hospital 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long did you remain Ill the F'ranklin hospital Y 
A. Thirteen weeks. 
Q. What were your injuries Y 
A. Three verteb1·a in the back were broken and I was 
paralyzed from my waist down. 
Q. When you say you were paralyzed from your waist 
down, do you have any use of any part of your body from the 
waist downY 
A. None whatever. I couldn't bend my limb any more than 
if it was a board for weeks. 
Q. What was the first treatment given you after you 
realized what was going on?. 
A. After I was in the hospital, do you mean? 
page 58 ~ Q. Yes. 
A. Of course they first put me on three boards, 
and I was in straig·hts between three boards for nine weeks. 
Q. How long did you say you remained on those three 
hoards? 
A. Nine weeks. . 
Q. Did you suffer any pain; Mrs. White Y 
A. I sure did. I sure did. suffer pain. 
Q. Over a period of what time? ~ I 
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A. I have always suffered; I suffered when I left there. 
When I left the hospital they put me on a stretcher like a baby 
and brought me home. 
Q. How much weight did you lose 1 
A. I fell off to 80 pounds, and usually I weighed 108, and 
I have been as high as 112. 
Q. You came from 108' or 110 to 80 pounds? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you been able to do any of yom~ work over the 
past year, or, rather, since July last year? 
A. No, sir. I tried to do a little, but I am not able to do 
anything. I am not even able to make up my bed. 
Q. How much of your time do you spend in bed now or on 
the sofa? · 
A. · About fourteen hours out of twenty-four hours, every 
bit of it, and sometimes lots more than that. 
page 59 ~ Q. Are you now able to use your limb as you 
- formerly could? · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where are you affected by pain now Y 
A. It is not where the break was but to the side. 
Q. You have your hand near your hip? 
A. Yes, sir. It is the same as a rising. 
Q. As a boil, do you mean! 
A. Yes, sir.; and it has been thnt way all this time. 
Q. Is it necessary for you to use crutches in what little 
hobbling around you d9? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are you under treatment of Dr. Abbitt at this time? 
A. Yes, sir. -
Q. Aud what does he do for you now f 
A. Well, he has prescribed massag·e and liniment, and T 
get someone to rub me. I don't keep a nurse right now; I 
did up until Christmas have a nurse. A lady would come in 
and massage my leg at night, and I take dope now to ease 
the pain. 
Q. You take that for what purposet 
A. To ease my pain. 
Q. Without enumerating· them, I hand you the hospital 
bill of $838.50; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
page 60 ~ Q. And then the other receipts are for nurses f 
A. Yes, sir, and the ambulance which hFought 
me I10me. 
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Q. Including the nurses, ambulance, laundry and crutches, 
it is $876.187 
A. Yes. 
Q. In addition to that, there is Dr . .Abbitt's bill and medi-
cine in February $16.50. A total of $1,731.18? 
A. Yes, sir. Last night I paid $2.25. 
Q. Up until yesterday your expense was the total amount 
I have repeated f · 
A. Yes. 
l\fr. Gilman: If your Honor please, I will introduce these. 
l\Ir. Hoffman: I don't think that these should go in. 
Mr. Gilman: It doesn't make any difference. 
CROSS EXAMINATJON. 
By Mr. Breeden: 
Q. Mrs. White, do you mind telling us your age t 
A. Sixty-four. 
Q. And this accident happened on .July 10, I believe, at 
about 6 :30f 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is July 10 of last summer! 
A. Yes. 
page 61 } Q. From your position in the ear, Mrs. White, 
could you state which side of the road Mrs. Chap-
pell had been driving on just prior to the accident? 
A. Well, naturally, she had been on her right side. 
Q. Do you know whether she was well to the right-hand 
side-that is, right close to the right-hand shoulder,-or was 
she nearer the center? 
A. I couldn't say, because there was not any car coming 
or going. There were. not any cars in sight, and naturally 
she would be on the edge, I would say. 
Q. This was daytime, was it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It was lig·hU 
_ A. Yes. 
Q. Was it raining at the time? 
. A. Not at the time of the accident; it had stopped, and 
it was not raining· because I was out there on the cushion 
after they put me out, and I didn't e;et wet. 
· Q. The road was still wet, wasn't 1U 
A. Of course it had not dried off, but it had stopped rain. 
ing some minutes, though. 
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Q .. Did you. state Mrs. Chappell was going abotit 35 to 40 
miles an hour? · 
A. I say betweeµ 35 and 40 miles an hour-something like 
that. I don't say that she was speeding. 
page 62 ~ Q. Mr,s. W11ite, did you notice what part of 
the road Mrs. Chappell was on 1 Let me see if 
I can ask you this way, to make it as simple as possible: 
You have testified, I believe, that you- noticed that she was 
almost off the left-hand side of the road when you first 
realized that she was in danger? · 
A. Yes, that she was too far on the left. 
Q. When you first realized that there was any danger! 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't see her cut over on that side of the road t 
A. Over on the left t · 
Q. Yes. You didn't see her going from the right to the 
left-hand side? 
A. I knew the car was g~ing wrong,, but, like I say, every-
thing was so quickly done you could hardly realize it. 
Q .. Do yon know what made it go over?· Were you con .. 
scions of some happening which made it go overf 
A. The only thing, I don't think she had her eyes on the 
road. 
Q. You can't say what yon think. You don't know, do 
youf 
A. Well, naturally there was some reason for it. 
Q. Of course there is some physical reason for every-
thing, but you don't have any knowledge of how 
page 63 ~ she got over there-what made the car go over 
there Y That is, you can't say whether she 
skidded, which I believe was a guess of yours at one time?' 
A. I was laying down in the hospital bed and wondering 
what did happen. · · 
Q. And you said it must have skiddedf · 
A. I said it must have skidded. 
Q. You said also that you thought the car went off on 
the right-hand side of the road, didn't you Y 
A. I didn't have any reason in the world to think so. No-
body ev~r mentioned automobile wreck to me in the hospital. 
I lay on the bed, and I thoug·ht she must have gone too far 
to the right, and then cut too short. Nobody was allowed 
to mention automobile wreck to me. 
Q. Ref erring back to the time when yon were in the car 
and riding· along just before this accident, did you hear the 
little child Peggy say anything to her mother in the carY 
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. A. No; I never paid any attention to it. She could have 
said it, and I would never have noticed it because I was not 
looking for anything. 
l\Ir. Breeden: Can the record show that we are proceed-
ing with this examination without waiving the objections 
we have noted? . 
The Court: With reference to the child's state-
page 64 } ment ¥ 
:Mr. Breeden : Yes. 
The Court: Yes. 
By Mr. Breeden: · 
Q. Every one in the car, as already has been shown, were 
reJatives, and you were all friends, and you all did carry 
on a running conversation like ladies would on a trip of 
that kind? 
A. No. I don't recall any conversation. We had just 
started good. 
Q. Was there something said about the little Brown child 
getting a nap, or something of that kind? 
A. A napY 
Q. About getting an afternoon nap, or getting to bed on 
time, or the fact that she had not had a nap? 
A. I don't recall it. 
Q. Mrs. White, if the child had said anything to her 
mother while you all were riding along there, and there was 
more or less a lull in the conversation, you would have heard 
it, wouldn't you? 
A. No, because you don't hear so well on the back seat 
unless you are listening attentively. 
Q. I believe you have testified somewhat the same as Mrs. 
Brown about seeing Mrs. Chappell bring her head up i 
A. Yes. 
· Q. At that time, when you saw her bring her 
page 65 r head up, the car was already about to turn over, 
was it noU • 
A. Yes, sir; just about. 
Q. What did you say¥ 
A. It was nearly off on the left. 
Q. And it all happened very quickly, and I believe some-
one said simultaneously or instantaneously, or something like 
that, right after it happened; isn't that true Y 
A. What happened? 
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Q. At the moment you say you saw this yourself, didn't 
you, Mrs. White, see l\Irs. Chappell move her head f 
A. Yes ; raising up. 
Q. You saw that yourself? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is not something· that someone told you? 
A. No. 
Q. We want only what you saw personally, and you saw 
that vourself t 
A. "'Yes. 
Q. That bobbing· up of her head 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. You had time yourself to notice where the car was Y 
A. I knew it was coming over then to the left, and in an-
other second it looked like to me it was over in the ditch. 
Q. In another second it was over, and you don't 
page 66 ~ know how it got over or what caused iU 
A. No. 
Q. Referring again to the fact you said it may have 
skidded or gone off the right-hand side of the road first, you 
don't know how or what caused it; is that true, Mrs. White f 
A. Well, no, I couldn't say what caused that. 
Q. I mean my statement is true-
A. If it went over on the right, I have no knowledge then 
of g·oing off on the right. 
Q. Mrs. White, again referring to the past statement, you 
said it happened so quickly you didn't realize what had hap-
pened until you were on the left-hand side of the road; did 
you so state f 
A. We were getting over on the left side. We were not en-
tirely off the right. 
Q. Was it just a matter of inches from the left-hand side 
of the road? 
A. I.didn't.notice at the time. An automobile turns mig·hty 
quickly when it starts. 
Q. You previously stated it might have _skidded? 
A. That was not anything; I was lying there just wonder-
ing· what caused it. 
Q. "'\Ve have all wondered, Mrs. White, and we are sorry--
Mr. Gilman: A.re you going to argue it now or 
pag·e 67 ~ later? 
Witness: I didn't know what may have caused 
it, and I was wondering what caused it, and all that. 
Thelma Chappell V~ Martha u. ,vhit.e. 
Martha C. White. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gihnan: 
Q. Mrs. White, before you noticed the driver, Mrs. Chap-
pell, raising up and then being on the extreme left side of 
the road, before that point, had you noticed anything unusual 
about the movement of the car in any way! 
A. No., sir. 
Q. There was no unusual bump or movement, or anything, 
until you found yourself on the left side of the road.¥ 
A. No; I hadn't noticed anything whatever. 
Q. No skidding or anything-
Mr. Breeden: She testified that she did say that it might 
have skidded., and that is one of the probabilities. 
].\fr. Gilman: 
Q. I am asking do you have any distinct reeollection or 
any feeling in riding in the automobile whether or not it did 
skid? 
Mr. Breeden: We object to that as leading .. 
The Court: It is in form a leading question, so I sus-
tain the objection. 
:M:r. Gilman: 
Q. I repeat my previous question. Before you noticed 
the proximity of the car to the ditch, when you 
page 68 r noticed this lady raising up, before that, did you 
notice any peculiarity or unusual movement of 
the car in anv manner before that Y 
A. No, sir." 
Q. Were you a perfectly normal and healthy woman be-
fore this accident? 
A. Yes, sir; I believe so. 
Q. And you did all your work? 
A. Yes, sir. 
1\fr. Gilman: If your Honor please, I expect to rest just 
as soon as I put on Dr. Raiford, from Franklin. 
Mr. Breeden: We can take up some legal points which 
Dr. Raiford knows nothing about. 
The Court: Do you want the jury to go out? 
Mr. Hoffman: What time does your Honor adjourn? 
The Court: The gentlemen may be adjourned for lunch 
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and come back at two o'clock. Gentlemen, yon will not dis-
cuss this case with anyone or let anyone discuss it with you.. 
{The. jury retired from the cou1~troom.) 
page 69 r, MOTION TO STRIKE. 
Mr. Hoffman: If your Honor please, I do not .suppose l\.fr .. 
Gilman has any objection to striking the evidence as to Mr .. 
Chappell 
The Court : Is there any point with reference to that, Mr .. 
· Gilman Y I do not think there is any evidence connecting Mr .. 
Chappell with it. 
Mr. Gilman: I don't like to agree with my adversary, but 
I suppose I · will have to. 
The Court: I will strike the evidence as to Mr. Chappell.. 
Mr. Hoffman: The other motion is to strike the evidence 
as to Mrs. Chappell. That brings us down to the discussion 
~f the gross negligence doctrine. 
( The motion to strike was argued by counsel) 
The Court: I overrule the motion. 
Mr. Hoffman : We except. 
Thereupon, at 1 :05 a recess was taken until 2 o'clock for 
lunch. At the expiration of that time the court reconvened 
· with the same counsel present as heretofore noted. 
page 70 ~ DR. M. B. RAIFORD, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, having been 
first duly sworn, testified as iollows: · 
Examined by Mr. Giiman: 
· Q. Your initials, I believe, are M. B. f 
A. That is right. 
Q. You are a practicing physician, · I believe, located at 
Franklin Y 
A. That is right. · 
Q. What is your length of practice, Doctor f 
A. Six years. 
Q. Are you a member of the staff of the hospital thereY 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is the name of the hospitaU 
A. Raiford Hospital. ! i · · 
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Q. Doctor, will you tell us the condition that you found 
Mrs. White, the plaintiff, in and your treatment of her and 
her present condition? 
A. Mrs. Eugene C. ·white was first seen by us about 7 :30 
P. M. on the night of July 10, 1942. She was brought into. 
the hospital at that time unable to walk, on a stretcher, with 
an injury to her back. This back injury, on X-ray examina-
tion and physical examination, was what we term a compres-
sion fracture of the first lumbar and second lumbar vertebra 
-that is, the two sections of the backbone just below the 
rib. There are five in that area, and they were 
page 71 ~ No. 1 and No. 2. The lumbar vertebra was sitting· 
in this (indicating) position and crushed forward. 
This vertebra was compressed just like you put it in a vice 
and so was No. 2. That pressed on the spinal cord, causing 
Mrs. White to be unable, at the time she came to the hos-
pital, to have any movement of the muscles from the hip 
down. That is, you could pinch her arms and feet and knees 
and toes and almost up to the site of injury and she had 
very little sensation of pain, and could not localize where a 
pencil point or pressure point happened to be. She remained. 
in the hospital until October 8, 1942, and during the time she 
stayed there there was a g·radual recovery or part use of the 
muscles in her legs. She was not able to walk without aid, 
and her recovery today is a little better than we thought at 
the time she left the hospital on October 8, 1942. 
Q. What was the treatment, Doctor? What did you do 
for her? 
A. The treatment for Mrs. White at that time was to give 
her medicine for the pain that she had in her back, to keep 
her rigidly quiet, and (illustrating) if this is the m~ttress 
of the bed to put boards under it.to make it absolutely straight 
and put sandbags under her legs and above her head. The 
reason a cast was not applied on Mrs. White was because of 
her age and what we term hardening of the arteries, or 
arteriosclerosis, and she ·was in somewhat of a 
page 72 ~ shock at the time, as the result of her injuries. 
Q. She was then, as I understand, stretched out 
on boards with sandbags packed around her Y 
A. Underneath the mattres~, just like this paper on top of 
this (illustrating). 
Q. She shows some improvement, but she still has some 
pa ralvsis in the legs? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Do you think it possible. that she will recover, or will 
she continue throughout life t 
A. I think it is about all that she will. She may hav~ fi,ve 
Qr ten per cent more improvement than she has now, ~nd that 
will help the muscles already damaged. 
Q. Was this a painful injury, l)octor? 
A. As long as l\'Irs .. White was not moved and stayed quiet, 
she had little cliscomfol-t at the time. However, we did have 
to give her sedatives of cod~in, and luminal, a sedative to 
help her rest and keep her quiet. 
Q. That was given for pain i 
A. Yes. 
Q. I believe you stated the spina,l cord ,vas injured? 
A. That is true. 
Q. Wh~t is 'the spinal cord, Doctor? 
A~ The spinal cord is the nerye trunk that runs from the 
base of the brain to the end of the spine. It is 
page 73 ~ aboi1t tile size of the little finger and writpped llP 
41 a rather thin consistency like you wr~p a papei· 
about a lea cl pencil, and it ia protected in a cover. The in-
jury of the spinal cord that sbe had was not a tearing in 
two of the little nerve trunk, as you would ~ telephone Cllble ; 
the fracture and the pressure of those bones against the 
spinal cord was what caused pE,trtial paralysis of her legs. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Breeden: 
Q. Doctor Raiford, Mrs. White has received as good medi-
oal attention, I think you can say with pride, as is possible 
to receive! . 
A. As far as we were able to determine, we gave her the 
hest medical treatment for her injury. 
Q. If she had be·en anywhere else she could not have gotten 
any other treatmenU An operation would not have done 
any g·ood 1 · 
A. An operation in the treatment of a case of this kind 
is of very little value. We have had similar injuries, but 
they were young people from twenty to thirty, and you can 
do something much more valua~le for them than at her age. 
Th~lm.a Chappell v. Marth~ C~ Whtte. fi~ 
page 74} · J. }4, :rA.NNY., 
~ wit~ess qn behf!,ij· of tl.:L~ plai:µtiff, w~s recall~cl, 
and testified as follows: · 
Examined by Mr. Gilman: 
Q. Mr. Faimy1 this mormµg yqu testified ·&,~ to the dist~:q.ce 
that the automobile traveled ~ft"~f it :r~a.ched the left s];u~ulq~r; 
will YQl! give :rµ~ tllat distf!,nc~ ~gain t 
A. 4-rgµ:qq 25 steps~ij g-ooc} st~ps, whi9h wo~ld be about 
75 feet. 
Q. W ~re t];i.Qse tracks ~traight down th~ shoulder, or did 
they not go dow11: ~tr~ig·4t T · 
A. Gradually from the shoulder of the road to where it 
turned over. 
, Q. And 'that was 75 feet 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. And hQw f~f b~y9nd tbi~ littl~ indeµtatiq11 ip. the shoul-
der did it go before it turned over in th~ dram y 
A. Approximately 25 ·teet 
CBOSS ~U.MIN.A.TION. 
Bv Mr. Breeden: 
~ Q. Y Q\l ~r~ an quto:m.o,bi)e IPa"!l; DQ you know the length 
of a P~xnti~c P~i~f.t~n-11, fo11ti~~ '42,~o yoµ ~now how long 
it is? 
. A, No; I dop.'t know. 
Q. Appro;i:m~~}y? 
page ·75 } A. I would say 14 feet-12 to 14 feet. I h~ve 
l)ey~i; rµe8;s~rec;l o:pe to be exact! . 
Q. It is w~y~ly 18 f e~t2 i~n 't it Y 
A. It is right ~oqc1 and l<;>~g, hut I never measured on~. 
Mr. Breeden: That is all. 
By 1\1:r. Gilman: 
Q. This w&s a 1942 Pontiac, w~sn 't it? 
A. I don't knQw whether- 1941 or 1942. 
By Mr. Breeden:· 
Q. Did you notice th~ spe~dorneter to see how far it had 
gone?: 
A. No, sir. 
I 
Mr. · Gilma1i; We rest, if ypuf Ho11or ple&se. 
:Pl~intiff reets. 
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a witness on behalf of the defendant, having been first duly 
sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Breeden: 
Q .. Will you please state your name· to the jnryf 
A. Mrs. Katie Elizabeth Rowe. 
Q. And you are the sister of Mrs. Thelma Chappell, one 
of the defendants in this case, are yon not Y 
page 76 ~ A. That is right. 
- Q. Now, Mrs. Rowe, I believe you- live at,.618 
South Street, Portsmouth; is that correct Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you- with your sister on July 10, the day that her 
car turned over on the Holland -road Y 
A. I was .. 
Q. Where were you riding in the automobile°l 
A. In the-back seat. - · 
Q. In which position on the back seat!' 
A. On the right-hand side. . 
Q. I believe at the time you all were returning from vis-
iting some relatives .in Franklin, or thereabouts t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you been over that road often and before? 
A. I. had been over it several times, but not maybe that 
year in the last few months. 
Q. Mrs. Rowe, tell us as best you can-let me ask yon first, 
do you drive an automobile yourselff 
A. I do not. · 
Q. Can you give us what speed Mrs. Chappell was driving 
her automobile just before the accident occurred Y 
A. Well, I should judge between 35 and 40. 
Q. Which side of the hi¢hway was she driving on f 
A. On the right-hand side. 
page 77 ~ Q. Can you tell us where on the right-hand side 1 
That is, wa~ she near the right-hand edge of the 
pavement~ or was she near the center of the pavement Y 
A. I think in the right lane. 
Q. Were you talking to anyone, or was anyone talking to 
vou, immediately before the accident f 
" A. Well, we were talking on the back seat together, the 
three of us.-Mrs. Brown, Mrs. White and I. 
Q. Did :Mrs. Chappell sav anvthin~ to you all shortlv be-
fore the accident or immediately before it, ratherY .. 
A. No. 
. ~.-
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Q. Did you hear either of her children say anything. to 
her?· 
.A. I did not. 
Q. Did you hear her say anything· to either of her chil-
dren? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Mrs. Rowe, tell us when you first noticed something 
unusual happen or had happened, and, if so, what did you 
see and what happened to the car? 
A. The first I noticed was when we were just on the other 
side of the road, just about ready to turn over in the ditch, 
someone made the statement, ''0h''-I don't know who it 
was-and they all noticed it about the same time. It was so 
quick it was all over. 
page 78 }- Q·; Mrs. Rowe, do you k~ow whether or not your 
sister drove the car over there, or whether it 
skidded over there, or can you tell us in any way how the 
car got from the right suddenly over to the left-hand side 
of· the road? Do · you know? 
A. No; I don't know. It was- a skid I would say-we had 
skidded over there. 
Q. Were you in a general way paying atte;ntion or look-
ing forward, or were you looking out of the window? In a 
general way, which way were you looking? 
A. I was looking forward, I should think and I would say. 
Q. Were you in position to S'ee that your car was on the 
left-hand side of the road if your sister had been driving 
down the left-band side ,)f the road Y 
A. Well, I don't know. I reckon so. I couldn't tell you. 
I reckon I was in the right-hand side, where I could see which 
side she was driving on. 
Q. Did you notice anything- unusual until the situation 
which you have just described Y • 
A. No. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gilman: 
Q. Mrs. Rowe, I believe you stated that there was no sud-
den movement of the car, no dashing, no skidding 
page 79 }- and nothing· unusual until you heard the exclama-
tion "Oh", and then you were already on the left 
sideY 
A. Repeat that, please. 
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Q. I understood you to say that there was nothing unusual 
about the driving, and no sudden jerking and no bump and 
no skidding, and you noticed nothing until you heard the ex-
clamation, ''Oh'' from somebody, and then you found your-
self on the left side of the road Y 
A. We skidded on the other side, but it was all over-
Q. (Interposing) You have not answered my question. Be-
fore you got to the left side of the road, when you heard 
someone say, "Oh", was there anything unusual to you in 
skidding or bumping Y 
A. No. 
Q. You say, "No"; you shake your head. 
A. No. 
RE-DIRECT E-XAI\fiNATION. 
By Mr. Breeden: 
Q. I forgot to ask you: I ask this question without waiv-
ing our previously noted objections in regard to any conver-
sation, noted during the trial. 
The Court : All right. 
Mr. Breeden: 
Q. Did you hear your little niece Peggy make any state-
ment after the accident while waiting to be taken to the hos-
pital? Did you hear the child make any state-
page 80 ~ mentv/ 
A. I did not. 
Mr. Breeden: That is all. 
Bv :Mr. Gilman: 
"'Q. What did you hear her say? 
A. I didn't hear her say anything. 
Q. She didn't say anything¥ 
A. No ; I didn't hear Peggy say anything. 
Q. You told Mrs. White so? 
A. No ; I don't think so. 
Q. You don't· think you heard her say anythingf 
!,... I know I did not. 
Thelma Chappell v. Marth~ C. White. 
MRS. THELMA CHAPPELL, 
one of the def end~nts, h~vj.ng been fifst duly sworn, t~stifie<l 
as follows: · 
Examined by l\fr~ Breeden; 
Q. Will you please state your name to. the jury 1 
A. Thelma Chappell. 
Q. And you are the wif~ of ¥r~ J~ W. Chapp~}!? 
.A.. Yes. · · · 
Q. Arid you are the defendant in this ~ase 1 
.A. Yes. 
Q. W '3re ypu the driver of the car that has been described 
in the t~stunony here as havj.ng turned over and as the re-
sult of which injured Mrsl' Wbj.t~? 
page 81 } A. Was I the .driver f 
Q. Ye.s, 
.A. Yes . 
. Q. What was the oo~aaion of thi.s trip? I mean. where ht;td 
you been? 
A. We had been to Franklin to visit some relatives. 
Q. And was this an 1).nnual. ~ffair for you Y . 
A. Yes; it was the fourth year we had been out. 
-Q~ .And Mrs. \Vhite ha.d ridden with you .each time 7 
· A. Xe.s. 
Q. You had taken her along· T 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, Mrs. Chapp.ell, .cpmhig back on this trip tell 'ijs, 
:first, if you will, what kind 9f car you were driving? 
A. I was driving· a '42 Chieftan Pontia~. 
Q. And how far ha.~ that ~ar been driven Y f. 
.A. Two thousand nu.Jes. . h 
Q. Now, coming hack in the car, I believe it h.as·-bien shown 
here that little Peggy was next to you and your own son 
Guilford was riding uext to the window in tb.e front seat 
with you? 
.A. Yes. 
Q. Was there plenty of room on the front seat for all three 
of you to ride t 
A. Yes; plenty of room. There is plenty of 
page 82 ~ r.oom up there for three grown people. 
Q. Did those .children at any time bump against 
y~? . 
A. No; they had plenty of room, and they had no occasion 
to. 
Q. You have testified that you had been up in the last 
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fonr yeairs ovei: this road· going and coming,· on this s·ame 
highway! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you .say you are familiar with the road from hav-
ing traveled it f 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the condition of the weather 011 this particul~r 
day? · 
A. It had been raining-not hard, but just enough to make 
the road sort of slippery. We had not had a downpour. 
Q. Had it stopped raining before the accident occurred t 
A. If it had not stopped; it was just about a drizzle, and 
had just about stopped. 
Q. Mrs. Chappell, how :fast were you driving your auto-
mobile immediately prior to this accident Y · . 
A. About 35 miles. 
Q. Now, the ladies in the back seat, were they carrying 
on any conversation with you-not back down the road, buf 
almost immediately prior to thisf 
A. No. I never talk to anyone on the 'back seat 
page 83 ~ when I am driving. · 
· Q. Mrs. Chappell, how were you driving with 
relation to the left or right-hand side of the road Y That is,. 
where were you on the highwayf 
A. On the right-hand side. 
Q. Do you know how wide that road is Y 
A. I would say around 30 feet. . . 
Q. :Mrs. Chappell, where was your car with relation to-
there are three lanes, I believe it is testified, and they were 
marked with white lines·; where was your car with relation to 
the white line on your side f 
A. As far as I remember, it was to my left-the first line 
that divides the road. . 
Q. Now, tell us, Mrs. Chappell, what first attracted your 
attention to the fact that everything was not going exactlv 
right, and further tell us, if you can, what happened to caus"e 
the car to get over on the left-hand side of the road? 
·A. I couldn't tell you to save my life what happened to 
cause it to get over there. I was g·oing along,. and all of a 
sudden it skidded and went over there, over to the left. 
Q. Did you apply the brakes? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you turn the wheel at all in an effort to 
page 84 ~ prevent-
A. No. When I noticed we were in danger, we 
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~ere too far to turn the wheel or anything of the kind to try 
to avoid it. It all happened so I was almost scared to death 
-· it all happened in such a minute. 
Q. Did the car run smoothly along that shoulder, or did it 
bounce along and hit any ruts in the shoulder? 
A. I will tell you the truth, I can't say whether it" did, or 
not. When I noticed, it was that far over to the edge it 
scared me so bad I just don't know whether we hit anything, 
or not, but most likely we did. · 
Mr. Gilman: I object to "most likely". 
The Court: That is not evidence, gentlemen. It is merely 
a supposition, and it is not to be considered by you as evi-
dence. 
By Mr. Breeden: 
Q. Mrs. Chappell, can you g·ive us any idea as to the time 
between the time the car first left the right-hand side of the 
road and when the accident was all over with? 
A. Well, I should say it was ten or fifteen seconds; that 
would cover it because it was all done in such a short while. 
It was all done in such a hurry. 
Q. Now, Mrs. Chappell, did the car turn entirely over? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was the last one to be helped from the 
page 85 ~ car? 
A. I was. ' 
Q. You were? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, after you got out of the car, Mrs. Chappell, did 
your little girl say anything to you with respect to-
A. When I got out of the car she ran to me. There were 
two men on either side of me. 
Mr. Breeden: Incidentally, your Honor, I want to say that 
we do this without waiving· our prior objections. 
The Court: All right. 
By Mr. Breeden: : 
Q. You can't say what the child said with respect to what 
anyone said, but the Court said it would hear evidence as 
to anything the child said about the way you had operated 
the car. Did she make any such statement to you Y 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. Mrs, Chapp<311, did you luwe fJnytbing to do with turn-
ing towards the child for tbe p11rpose of getting niµd off her 
shoes, tying her shoes, looking at her shoes or leg, or ar,y-
thing· in relation to your little daughter named Peggy, who 
was riding with .YOU? 
A~ N Q, sir; I did not. 
Q. l inte:n.de~ fqr that que~tion., Mrs. Chappell, to relate to 
i:rnm~diately prior to t:he a~ciq.ent. 
A. ·when we left Mrs: Daug·htry's, if you want me tQ g·o 
back that far, she had some dirt on the bottom of 
page 86 r hei· shoe, and just as she got into the car she said, 
'' Mother, I have some dirt on the bottom of my 
~ho~'', and there was a paper bag that we had some apples 
in, and I said to wipe it off, and she did before we got to the 
highway. 
Q. Do you mean coming down the road from the Daughtry 
house to the hig·bway f . 
A. Yes. 
Q. How far wa.s that from the scene of the accident? 
A. l judge arouqd three miles. 
Q. Do you know bow wide the front seat of your automo-
bile is? · 
A . .Approximately five feet. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gilman: 
Q. This was a new automobile, was iU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And in g·ood condition, I imagine t 
A. I beg your pardon? 
Q. ln good mechanical condition f 
A. Yes. 
Q. In fact, your husband has been in the automobile busi-
ness a long time, hasn't he f 
A. Yes. 
page 87 ~ 
clean? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the car was new and was kept clean 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. A.nd you were very proud about keeping it 
Q~ I believe when this little child got into the car it hacl 
been raining &nd she had mud on her shoe f 
A. I will not ,say mud, but more like dirt. 
Thelma Clutppell v. Martha C ... Whjtel' 
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Q. ln CQm.µrn· ~lgng, ypu tQld he;r tp take the bag and wipe 
the dirt off? q ·--· · · 
A. When she told me that ijhe had dirt on her shoe, just 
,after ah~ left Mr~. Dau~·4try's, l told her tQ wipe it off; but 
that was before we got to the Qounty roa.d, M;r~. Daughtry's 
house is a little way from the road. 
Q. And I believe you say the time y0.u left th(}' right-hand 
side of the road until the time you got into the ditch· was ten 
P'P fif t~en seoo.:ndl:J 1 
A. Yes, sir; I judge it to be that. 
)fr!' B;reedM; l do;n. 't k.n.ow that it mtikes a )Qt of differ-
ence in time, but the question I asked wiis tQ try_ 1;to give eome 
estimate of the time from the time she left the right u:ntil 
the accident. · · 
lVIr. Gilman: She is P'!l cross exmnination ;now, if your 
Honor please. 
lVIr. Breeden: He misquoted it, your Honor, and I think 
it unfair to the lady. 
The Court: That is a matter for the jury to de-
page 88 } termine 
l\fr. Breeden: All right, sir. 
By Mr. Gilman: 
Q. I believe you 83id the first time you noticed anything 
wrong· WJ,lS wb-en y0.u were so f~r to the 1(3ft there was npth-
ing· you could do· P.-Pout iU 
A. That is rig·ht. 
P. D. HOLLAND, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, having been first duly. 
sworn, testified as follows; 
Examii;ted by Mr. Breeden: 
Q. Mr. Holland, you are an automobile mechanic, are yQu 
not? 
A. Yes. 
Q.- Are you familiar with what is !mown as a 1942 Pontjac 
Chieftanf 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know how long such an automobile· is from 
bumper to bumper! 
A.· I don't know ex~ctly the l~ngth. 
Q. Can you give us any rough idea of it f I don't mean 
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as to inches-, but: is it fourteen or fifteen or sixteen or seven-
teen feet, or do you know? · 
A. ·I couldn't exactly say.· 
page 89 ~ Q. Do you know the car of ¥r. Chappell that 
· · was in this accident! 
A. 1:es, sir. . 
Q. Did ypu work on itt 
A .. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Had you worked on it prior to J nly 10, the day that this 
accident occurred! · 
A. I worked on it the day before. 
Q .. Can you say ·what the mechanical condition of it was 
the day it left the shop t 
A. Perfect. 
Mr. Breeden: Answer Mr. Gilman .. 
Mr. Gilman: No questions. 
Mr. Breeden: We rest. 
The Defendant rests. · 
page 90 ~ (IN THE JUDGE'S OF·FICE) 
Mr .. Hoffman: We renew our motion to strike out the evi-
dence on the ground that all of the evidence as submitted 
does not establish a case of gross negligence. 
(The motion was overruled1 and exception noted by coun-
sel for the defendant.) 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
Mr. Hoffman: The defendant objects and excepts to t11e 
Court granting any instruction for the plaintiff in this case 
on the ground that the motion to strike out the evidence at 
the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony should have been sus-
tained; on the further ground that the same motion should 
have been sustained at the conclusion of the entire evidence 
being introduced. This case being a guest case, it is gov-
erned by the law of gToss negligence. The evidence · clearly 
shows that Mrs. -Chappell 's negligence, if any there was, 
constituted a casual inattention which does not in itself con-
stitute gross negligence. · 
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flaintiff 's Instruction P-1 (gratnted) : 
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. '' The . Court instructs the jury that if they believe from 
a preponderance of the evidence that the defencl-
pag,e 91 ~ ant failed to keep a proper lookout, and if this 
was gross negligence under all the circumstances 
then existing and that such gross negligence was the cause 
of the accident, then they should find a verdict for the plain-
tiff.'' 
l\fr. Hoffman: The defendant excepts to the Court grant-
ing Instruction P-1 on the grounds previously assigned as 
error in the Court's ruling· on the motion to strike out tbe 
plaintiff's evidence and the refusal to grant Instruction 1-D; 
and upon the further ground that Instruction P-1 does· not 
use the lang'Uage '' proximate cause'' and endeavors to point 
out that the failure to keep a proper lookout is in itself gross 
negligence. The said instruction is tantamount to a :finding 
instruction. 
Pla-intiff 's Instruction P-2 (granted): 
'' The Court instructs the jury that if you believe by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Mrs. White's injurie~ 
were caused by the gross neglig·ence of Mrs. Chappell, your 
verdict should be for the plaintiff.'' 
Mr. Hoffman: The defendant excepts to the g-ranting of 
Instruction P-2. on the ground that the words "proximate 
cause'' are not used, and upon the further grounds assigned 
under the ruling on the motions to strike out the evidence 
·and the ruling of the Court in refusing to grant Instruction 
1-D. 
page 92 ~ Plaintiff's Instruction P-tJ (granted) : 
'' The Court instructs the jury that if they find for the 
plaintiff that in estimating her damages they may take into 
consideration: 
'' (a) Whether or not her injuries are temporary or per-
manent; · 
'' (b) The probable effect of said injuries on the health of 
the plaintiff; 
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'' ( c) The Physical suffering which has resulted, or may 
hereafter result, from said injuries ; 
'' (d) The inconvenience and discomfort caused and which 
may probably be caused hereafter from said injuries; 
" ( e) And doctor, medical or hospital bills incurred as a 
result of the injuries; 
"(f) A.ud they may assess her damages at such sum as 
they may think sufficient under the evidence.'' 
Mr. Hoffman: The defendant excepts to the granting· of 
Instruction P-3 for the reasons previously assigned and the 
rulings on other instructions in this case. 
Plaintiff's· Instruction P-4 ( refused) : 
''The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the 
evidence that Mrs. White's injuries were caused by the gross 
negligence of Mrs. Chappell or her wilful and wanton dis-
regard of the safety of Mrs. White, your verdict should be 
for the plaintiff.'' 
Mr. Gilman: Mr. Hoffman, of counsel, for the def eud-
ants, objected to the form of Instruction P-4 for 
page 93 ~ the reason that there is no evidence that 1\frs. 
Chappell was guilty of any wilful and wanton con-
duct. The Court refused it for the reason that it is giving 
Instruction No. 2. The plaintiff excepts for the reason that 
that instruction gives the whole of the section of the Code 
applicable. 
Plaintiff's lnstritction P-5 ( refused) : 
'' The Court instructs the jury that it was the duty of Mrs. 
Chappell to d1·ive her vehicle on the right side of the road 
and to· have it under reasonable control.'' · . 
Mr. Gilman: Plaintiff excepts to the action of the. Court 
in refusing Instruction P-~ for the reason that it is a proper 
statement of the law, merely quoting' the statute and is sup-
ported by the evidence. 
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Defendant's Instruction. 1-D (refused): 
"The Court instructs the jury that there is no evidence iu 
this case upon which you can return a verdict for the plain-
tiff against either defendant.'' 
Mr. Hoffman: For the reasons hereinbefore mentioned 
and the f~ct that there is insufficient evidence to allow this 
case to go to the jury, the defendant excepts to the Court's 
refusal to grant Instruction 1-D. 
page 94} Defendant's Instruction 2-D (granted): 
· '' The Court instructs the jury that there is no evidence 
in this case upon which you can return a verdict for the plain-
tiff against the defendant, J. W. Chappell.'' 
Defetidmit'.s Instruction 3-D (refused): 
'' The Court instructs the jury that casual inattention does 
not constitute gross negligence. J' · 
The Court: .Covered under 4-D. 
Defen~anJ~.s lnstruc~ion 4-D (granted): . 
'' The Court instructs the jury that it is not sufficient for 
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was g·uilty of lack 
of ordinary care, simple inadvertence or casual inatte11tion, 
but the plaintiff must go further and prove, by a preponder-
ance of the evid~nce., that the defendant operated the auto-
mobile in a grossly negligent manner. Gross negligenee is 
that degree of negligence which shows an utter disregard of 
prudence amounting to complete neglect of the safety of an-
other. . 
'' The Court further instructs the jury that the mere fact 
that an· accident occurred and that the plaintiff received in-
juries raises no presumption of such gross negligence.'' 
Mr. Gilman: Plaintiff excepts to the action of the Court 
in granting Instruction 4-D for the defendant as not a proper 
statement of law, not supported by the evidence, 
page 95 ~ and leaves to the jury to guess what simple inad-
vertence or casual inattention is. 
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Defendant's. Iustruction 5-D (refused): 
-~'The Q.ourt instructs the jury that under the evidence in 
this· case the plaintiff, Mrs .. White, was riding as a guest in. 
the automobile driven by the defendant, Mrs. Chappell. Un-
less. you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the 
injurfos sustained by the plaintiff were caused directly ancl 
proximately by the. grossly neg·ligent c;>pera.tion of the auto-
mobile by the defendant, the. plaintiff. cannot recove:r and 
your verdict must be for the defendant.'' 
The Court: .covered in 4-D. 
Mr. Hoffman: The defendant excepts to the Court's re-
fusal to grant Instruction 5-n on the ground that the In-
struction 4-D granted by the Court fails to state the status 
of the plaintiff as a guest in the automobile of the defendant; 
and upon the further ground that Instruction 4-D does not 
state that- the injuries must have been caused by '' the direct 
and proximate'' gross negligence of the defendant, which por-
tions of the instruction should have been inserted under In-
struction 4-D, or a separate instruction such as that should 
have been granted. 
Defendant's Instriection 6-D (granted}: 
"The Court instructs the jury that it wus not 
page 96 ~ negligence or unsafe for the defendant and her 
· two children to be riding in the front seat of the 
automobile.'' 
Mr. Gilman: The plaintiff excepts to the action of the Court 
in granting for the defendant Instruction 6-D for the rea-
son that it is confusing, is not a proper statement of law, is 
not supported by the evidence, there being no evidence .. ijnd 
no contention on the part of the plaintiff that the mere fact 
that there were two children on the front seat was the cause 
of the accident; and ·it invades the province of. the jury~ 
Defendant's In.struction 7-D (granted): 
'' The Court instructs the jury that there is no evidence 
in this case that the car driven by the defendant wa~. being 
operated at an unlawful rate of speed." · 
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Mr. Hoffman: Defendant . excepts to the Court's granting 
Instruction 7-D with the words, "or negligent" stricken out 
following the word "unlawful" on the ground that there is 
no evidence in this case to establish the fact that the de-
fendant was operating said automobile at a negligent rate of 
speed. 
l\fr. Gilman: The defendant excepts to the action of the 
Court in g-ranting Instruction 7-D for the defendant for 
the reason that it is not a proper statement of law, is not 
supported by the evidence, it invades the province 
page 97 ~ of the jury, it being for the jury to say whether, 
under all the circumstances then existing, what 
was the proper speed. 
Defenda.nt's Instruction 8-D (granted): 
"The Court instructs the jury that there is no evidence 
in this case that · the car driven by the defendant was l)ot 
equipped with proper brakes and other safety devices.'' 
Mr. Gilman: The plaintiff excepts to the action of the 
Court in granting Instruction 8-D on behalf of the defend-
ant for the reason that it is not a proper statement of law, 
is not supported by the evidence, there being no evidence 
concerning the brakes or the application of the brakes, and 
it invades the province o.f the jury. 
Defendant's Instruction 9-D (ref1tsed): 
'' The -Court instructs the jury that to constitute gross neg-
ligence, the acts of the defendant should shock fair-minded 
men." 
The Court: '' Gross negligence'' is defined in another in-
struction. 
Mr. Hoffman: The defendant excepts to the Court's re-
fusal to grant Instruction 9-D for the reason that the lan-
guage used therein follows the languag·e in the case of Car-
roll v. Miller, decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia June 
10, 1940. 
page 98 ~ The defendant further excepts to the Court's 
refusal to insert such language in Instruction 4-D, 
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which partially defines '' gross negligence'', in which the de-
fendant requested that the language used in 9-D be added to 
Instruction 4-D. 
The Court read the instructions to the jury. 
The case was argued by Mr. Gilman on behalf of the plain-
tiff and by Mr. Breeden on behalf of the defendant. 
The jury retired to consider its verdict at 4 :44 P. M., and 
returned to the court room at 5 :12 P. M. with the following 
verdict: 
''We, the· jury, find for the plaintiff, Martha C. White, 
and fix damages at seven thousand five hundred dollars 
against the defendant, Thelma Chappell.'' 
Mr. Hoffman: Your Honor, will you continue the motion 
for a new triai on the ground that the verdict is contrary to 
the law and evidence? 
The Court: Yes: 
page 99 ~ And at another day, to-wit: the 26th day of 
·March, 1943, an order of court was entered in 
the words and figures following, to-wit: 
This day_ canie the parties by their attorneys, thereupon 
came a jury, to-wit: J. H. vJ est, W. B. Kidd, C. F. Abbott, 
J. L. Sanderlin, Willie Kelley, Armond Cochener and R. E. 
Cooper, who were duly sworn the truth to speak upon the 
issue joined and after having fully heard the evidence and 
argument of counsel, retired to their room to consult of a 
verdict, and after sometime returned into Court having found 
the following ve1·dict, "We the jury find for the plaintiff, 
Martha C. White and fix the damage at the sum of Seven 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,50o~oo) against the de-
fendant, Thelma Chappell.'' 
Thereupon the defendant, by counsel, moved the Court to 
set aside the verdict of the jury in this case and grant her a 
new trial upon the grounds that the same is contrary to the 
law and evidence, the hearing of which motion is continued. 
And at at1other day, to-wit: the 20th day of May, 1943, 
.an order of Court was entered in the words and figures fol-
lowing, to-wit: · ... · · · 
This clay came the parties by their attorneys and the Court 
having fully J1eard and considered the motion for a new hial 
: Thelma Chappell v. Martha C. White. 
in this case, doth overrule same, to which action of the Co.~rt 
in overruling said motion, the defendant, by 
JJage 100} counsel, excepted. . : . 
Thereupon it is considered by tj:ie. Court that 
the plaintiff, Martha C. White, recover against the. def end-
ant, Thelma Chappell, the sum of Seven Thousand Five Hun-
dred Dollars, ($7,500.00), the verdict by the· jury in this case 
ascertained. ., . 
Thereupon the said defendant signifying a ~aesi,:~ to apply 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, for a w~-it of 
error and su,persedeas to said judg·ment; it is further ·or-
dered that execution of said judgment b~ suspended for the 
period of Sixty ( 60) days from this date. 
page 101} JUDGE'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, L. W. I' Anson, Judge of the Court of HustiUoo-s for the 
City of Portsmouth, Virginia, who presided over the trial 
of the case of Martha C. White v .. J. W. Chappell and Thelma 
Chappell, sitting for Hon. A. B. Carney, Judge of the First 
Judicial Circuit of Virginia, in the Circuit Court of Nor-
folk County,. Virginia, on March 26, 1943, certify that t};le 
for~going is a· true and correct transcript of the evidence 
adduced; the objections to evidence, or any part thereof, of-
fered, admitted, rejected, or stricken out; and the instruc-
tions granted, refused and amended; the rulings of the 
Court; and the exceptions of the parties ; and other incidents 
of the trial of said case. 
I further certify that this certificate has been tendered to 
and signed by me within the time prescribed by Code sec-
tion 6252 for tendering and signing bills of exception, and, 
t]1at reasonable notice in writing has been given to the at-
torney for the plaintiff of. the time and place at which said 
certificate has been tendered. 
Given under my hand this 25th day of May, 1943. 
L. W. !'ANSON, 
Judge of the .Court of Hustings for the City 
of Portsmouth, sitting for- Hon. A. B. 
Carney, Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Norfolk County. 
A .copy teste : 
L. vV. !'ANSON, Judge. 
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page 102 ~ CLERK'S CERTIE'ICA.TK 
I, V .. C .. Randall, Clerk of the Circuit .Court of Norfolk: 
County; Virginia, do certify that the foregoing report of the 
testim.011ti,~i11structions, exceptions and other incidents of the 
trial of the <lase of Martha C. White v. J. W. Chappell and 
Thelma ,Chappell; which has been duly authenticated by Hon .. 
L. W. I' Anso~, Judge of the Court of Hustings, for the City 
of Portsmouth, Virginia, who presided at said trial, sitting 
for Hon. A.. ~- Carney, Judge of the Circuit Court of Nor-
folk ·County, Virginia, was lodged and filed with me as Clerk 
of the said Court on the 25th day of May, 1943. 
V. C. RANDALL, Clerk. 
By .A. vV. -SNOW, D. C. 
page 103 ~ CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
· I, V. C. Randall, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Norfolk 
County, Virginia, do certify that the foregoing is a true 
transcript of the record in the case of Martha C. White v~ 
J. W. Chappell and Thelma Chappell, lately pending in said 
court. 
I further certify that the same was not made up and com-
pleted and delivered until the plaintiff had received due notice 
thereof and of the intention of the defendants to apply to 
the Supreme Court of Appeals for a writ of error and super-
sedeas to the judgment therein. 
V. C. RANDALL, Clerk .. 
By A. W. SNOW, D. C. 
A Copy, teste ·: 
V. C. RANDALL, Clerk .. 
By A. W. SNOW, D. C. 
Cost of Record $7 .00. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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